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I investigate the effects of information frictions in price setting decisions. I
show that firms’ output prices and wages are less sensitive to aggregate economic
conditions when firms and workers cannot perfectly understand (or know) the ag-
gregate state of the economy. Prices and wages respond with a lag to aggregate
innovations because agents learn slowly about those changes, and this delayed ad-
justment in prices makes output and unemployment more sensitive to aggregate
shocks.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I show that workers’ noisy information
about the state of the economy help us to explain why real wages are sluggish. In
the context of a search and matching model, wages do not immediately respond to
a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to
demand higher wages. This increases firms’ incentives to post more vacancies, and
it makes unemployment volatile and sensitive to aggregate shocks. This mechanism
is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile
unemployment: the flexibility of wages for new hires and the cyclicality of the
opportunity cost of employment. Calibrated to U.S. data, the model explains 60%
of the overall unemployment volatility. Consistent with empirical evidence, the
response of unemployment to TFP shocks predicted by my model is large, hump-
shaped, and peaks one year after the TFP shock, while the response of the aggregate
wage is weak and delayed, peaking after two years.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I study the role of information
frictions and inventories in firms’ price setting decisions in the context of a monetary
model. In this model, intermediate goods firms accumulate output inventories,
observe aggregate variables with one period lag, and observe their nominal input
prices and demand at all times. Firms face idiosyncratic shocks and cannot perfectly
infer the state of nature. After a contractionary nominal shock, nominal input prices
go down, and firms accumulate inventories because they perceive some positive
probability that the nominal price decline is due to a good productivity shock. This
prevents firms’ prices from decreasing and makes current profits, households’ income,
and aggregate demand go down. According to my model simulations, a 1% decrease
in the money growth rate causes output to decline 0.17% in the first quarter and
0.38% in the second followed by a slow recovery to the steady state. Contractionary
nominal shocks also have significant effects on total investment, which remains 1%
below the steady state for the first 6 quarters.
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Chapter 1: The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Wages un-
der Information Frictions
1.1 Introduction
Search and matching models are an appealing way to study fluctuations in the
labor market, as they define unemployment in a manner that is consistent with sta-
tistical agencies’ convention and describe in an attractive way the functioning of the
labor market, how firms and workers are matched and how wages are negotiated.1
However, Shimer (2005) pointed out the low volatility of unemployment predicted
by the standard search and matching model, hence giving rise to a large body of
literature studying the amplifying effects of sluggish wages. This approach to the
Shimer Puzzle has been criticized in recent years on the basis that, empirically,
wages for new hires exhibit little rigidity while the opportunity cost of employment
is pro-cyclical.2 In this chapter, I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based
1Rogerson and Shimer (2011) assess in more detail how models with search frictions have shaped
our understanding of aggregate labor market outcomes.
2For example, Rudanko (2009) shows in a model with long-term contracts that wage rigidity
does not increase unemployment volatility as long as wages for new hires are flexible. Mortensen
and Nagypal (2007) argue that the literature has overemphasized the need for sticky wages to
increase unemployment volatility in the standard model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
highlight three other features that could help explain the Shimer puzzle: (1) a low elasticity of
the matching function with respect to vacancies, (2) a low value for the flow opportunity cost
of employment, and (3) strong feedback from the job-finding rate to wages. Similarly, Pissarides
(2009) critiques the assumption of sticky wages based on empirical evidence that wages for new
1
on workers’ noisy information about the state of the economy that is robust to the
aforementioned critiques and that generates business cycle dynamics for unemploy-
ment and wages that are consistent with the empirical evidence.3
In my model, wages for new hires are flexible, but wages do not adjust imme-
diately to the true state of the economy because agents learn slowly about aggregate
shocks. This delayed adjustment in wages increases firms’ incentives to expand em-
ployment, making unemployment volatile and sensitive to aggregate shocks. My
model is able to explain 60% of overall unemployment volatility and generates wage
semi-elasticities with respect to unemployment of around -3%, which is a conserva-
tive number in the literature.
The model presented in this chapter is in many respects similar to a standard
RBC model with search and matching in the labor market. I introduce heteroge-
neous firms and assume that they differ in their permanent total factor productivity
levels, which are public information. Hence, in equilibrium, the most productive
firms are larger and pay higher wages. In order to distinguish between new hires
coming from unemployment and job changers, I assume that workers search on the
job for better-paid jobs. However, the most important distinction in this model
versus the existing literature is that workers (households) face information frictions
regarding aggregate conditions. In particular, the only source of aggregate uncer-
hires (job changers or new hires coming from unemployment) are more pro-cyclical than are wages
for existing workers (e.g. Beaudry & DiNardo, 1991; Bils 1985; Haefke, Sonntag & van Rens 2013;
Shin, 1994).
3Even though this chapter focuses on labor market fluctuations, sticky wages are potentially im-
portant for other macroeconomics questions. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007) find that nominal wage stickiness is one of the most important
frictions for understanding macroeconomic dynamics under nominal shocks.
2
tainty is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), which is not directly observed by
workers. Instead, workers form expectations based on a public and noisy signal that
they receive each period. This implies that TFP shocks are only partially perceived
by workers, who slowly learn about aggregate conditions as time goes by. This in-
formation friction affects households’ and workers’ decisions including consumption
and saving. Firms and workers negotiate wages each period. Workers negotiate
wages based on their beliefs about the aggregate state of the economy. Hence, af-
ter a positive productivity shock, wages remain relatively constant because workers
do not immediately possess the proper information to demand higher wages, which
generates sluggish wages within jobs. In other words, if productivity increases at
time t, the wage demanded by workers at firm j at time t will not be very different
from the wage that workers demanded at firm j at time t− 1.
The persistence in wages within jobs increases firms’ incentives to hire work-
ers in an expansion as they get to keep a larger fraction of the match surplus.
However, in equilibrium, the high-paying/most-productive firms hire proportionally
more new workers than the low-paying/less-productive firms in response to a posi-
tive productivity shock. This is because there is a significant increase in job-to-job
flows as a consequence of the increase in employment, which reduces the average
duration of a match for less productive firms and therefore the value of an additional
worker. Given that firms have to pay a cost for recruiting new workers, low-wage
less-productive firms end up paying this cost more frequently than more productive
firms.4 In addition, an increase in aggregate TFP reduces the pool of unemployed
4For example, Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2013) find a large heterogeneity in hires,
3
workers, which makes it more difficult for low-paying firms to find new workers
but doesn’t significantly affect high-wage firms, as they rely more on the pool of
employed searchers to fill a vacancy.
In addition to this differential employment growth rate, I also find in my
model that high-paying firms tend to exhibit more “flexible” wages in the sense
that their wages increase more during expansions. This is a direct consequence of
the differential employment growth rate. Notice that an increase in consumption
and employment at firm j increases the opportunity cost of employment at that
firm because workers would prefer to enjoy more free time.5 In an expansion, high-
paying firms have to offer higher wages in order to compensate their workers not
only for the increase in consumption but also for the larger increase of employment.6
However, in an expansion, low-paying firms do not have to increase their wages as
much as high-paying firms because, even though consumption increases, employment
at low-paying firms is expanding at a lower rate. Hence, even though wages within
jobs adjust slowly to the true state of the economy, the average wage for new hires
exhibits a large positive response to productivity shocks on impact. This is because
a new hire faces more and better-paying job opportunities in an expansion than in
a recession. However, even after controlling for this composition effect, my model
separations and vacancy duration across firms. In addition, they find that firms with higher
employment growth have higher vacancy yields.
5Following Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014), the flow opportunity cost of employment
in my model is the sum of two components: (1) foregone unemployment benefits and (2) the
foregone value of non-working activities in terms of consumption. Hence, the faster firm j grows,
the larger the opportunity cost of employment for its employees, as the foregone value of non-
working activities in terms of consumption increases.
6Notice that an increase in consumption makes the value of non-working activities rise in terms
of consumption, given decreasing marginal utility of consumption.
4
generates wage semi-elasticities with respect to the unemployment rate for new hires
and job changers of around -3%, which is similar to the estimate of Pissarides (2009)
and larger than the estimates of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) and Gertler et al.
(2014).
What does the empirical evidence tell us about the mechanism proposed in this
chapter? Using employer-employee data for the U.S., Kahn and McEntarfer (2014)
find that employment at high-wage firms is more sensitive to the business cycle.
According to their estimates, the differential employment growth rate (high minus
low-paying firms) is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate, and this dif-
ference is not driven by a more cyclically-sensitive product demand for high-paying
firms or because high-wage firms suffer more from earnings rigidities. Hence, a de-
cline in unemployment is associated with a larger increase in employment at high-
wage firms. In addition, they find that during a downturn, the distribution of new
matches shifts towards low-paying firms, whose separation rate declines more than
high-paying firms because of the reduction in job-to-job transitions. Therefore, even
though net employment changes are more procyclical at high-paying firms, gross
worker flows are more procyclical at low-paying firms. Using employer-employee
data for the U.S., Haltiwanger, Hyatt and McEntarfer (2015) find that job-to-job
flows do reallocate workers from lower-paying to higher-paying firms and that this
reallocation is highly procyclical. They find that net employment growth for high-
wage firms is substantially greater in times of low unemployment compared with
low-wage firms, which is driven by net poaching from low-wage to high wage firms.
Similarly, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) find that employment growth is more
5
negatively correlated with the unemployment rate at large high-paying firms than
at small low-paying firms. Moreover, they find that this fact holds mainly within,
not across, sectors and states. In an earlier paper, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2008), using different data sources, conclude that “following a positive aggregate
shock to labor demand, wages respond little on impact and start rising when firms
run out of cheap unemployed hires and start competing to poach and to retain em-
ployed workers” (p, 2). Hence, wages increase for two reasons: first, workers are
paid progressively more, and second workers move to higher-paying firms.7
Meanwhile, my assumption about information frictions finds empirical support
in the work by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). They compute forecast errors
made by professional forecasters, consumers and firms, and document that forecast
errors are not consistent with the predictions of a model with perfect information.
Rather, they find that forecast errors follow a mean reverting process with a per-
sistence between 0.8 and 0.9. According to their results, the behavior of forecast
errors is more consistent with a model in which agents receive noisy signals about
aggregate conditions, as I assume in this chapter. In addition, Carroll (2003) formu-
lates and finds evidence in favor of a model in which consumers have a larger degree
of information rigidity than other agents. Similarly, Roberts (1998) finds evidence
of non-rational expectations in survey data, and Branch (2004) argues that surveys
7Similarly, there is a large literature that points out the existence of sectoral wage differences for
the U.S. and differences in the cyclical behavior of employment across sectors. Some examples are:
Abraham and Katz (1986), Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1995),
Horrace and Oaxaga (2001), Juhn, Muphy, and Pierce (1993), Krueger and Summer (1988), and
Rielly and Zanchi (2003). One interpretation of these facts is that the sectors more subject to
cyclical demand pay higher wages in order to compensate workers for higher unemployment risk
(e.g. Barlevy, 2001, Okun, 1973, McLaughlin & Bils, 2001).
6
reject the rational expectation hypothesis not because agents use an ad hoc expecta-
tion rule, but rather because agents optimally decide not to use a more complicated
expectation (predictor) function.
I calibrate my model using U.S. data for the period 1964-2014. In order to
address the cyclicality of wages for job stayers versus new hires, I use the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) microdata in order to compute the average wage for
these two groups of workers controlling for composition effects (e.g. Solon, Barsky
& Parker, 1994; Haefke, Sonntag & van Rens, 2013; Muller, 2012). Given that the
driving force of this model is shocks to aggregate productivity, I follow the literature
that investigates the effects of TFP innovations in order to estimate the fraction of
business cycle moments that can be explained by aggregate temporary productivity
shocks (e.g. Barnichon, 2010; Basu, Fernald & Kimball, 2006; Blanchard & Quah,
1989; Christiano, Eichenbaum & Vigfusson, 2003, 2005; Gali, 1999). I find in the
data that between 70 and 75% of overall business cycle volatility in labor market
quantities such as unemployment, vacancies and the vacancy-unemployment ratio
can be explained by temporary TFP innovations. In contrast, only 25% of the over-
all volatility in wages can be attributed to such transitory productivity shocks. For
quantity variables, I find significant Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to produc-
tivity shocks that exhibit a hump-shaped behavior, peaking one year after the TFP
shock. The maximum responses indicate that, following a 1% increase in produc-
tivity, the total number of unemployed workers declines by 6%, vacancies increase
by 7% and the vacancy-unemployment ratio goes up by 15%. I find that wages,
adjusted for composition effects, are procyclical, but I do not find significant differ-
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ences in the cyclicality of wages for different groups of workers. In contrast to labor
market quantities, IRFs for wages are weak and delayed, peaking 2 years after the
TFP shock. After a 1% increase in aggregate productivity, wage responses are very
small in absolute value during the first 3 quarters (less than 0.2%). Even though
wages increase 1% above their trend 2 years after the shock, this effect is not sta-
tistically significant, indicating that wage responses to transitory TFP shocks are
weak.
The model calibrated to the U.S. economy is able to explain between 60 and
70% of the volatility of unemployment, vacancies, and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio and 90% of the volatility in output, consumption and investment that is due
to TFP shocks. A graphical inspection reveals that the dynamics predicted by my
model are very close to the dynamics estimated in the data. My model generates
IRFs that are hump-shaped with peaks consistent with the empirical evidence that
I present.
I also show that assuming sticky wages for continuing workers amplifies the
unemployment response to productivity shocks, in contrast to previous literature for
which the wage of job stayers is irrelevant for vacancy decisions. If a worker has to
negotiate her wage for the following n periods, she gives up using the new information
she would otherwise be using in the future. Therefore, wages take longer to adjust to
the true state of the economy, which increases the firm’s incentives to post vacancies.
Similarly, I show that assuming that firms face the same information frictions would
reinforce my results. If firms observe their overall productivity at all times but
cannot distinguish between idiosyncratic productivity shocks and aggregate shocks,
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they will partially attribute aggregate shocks to idiosyncratic conditions. Hence,
firms will underestimate the decline in the separation rate that is due to productivity
shocks and will tend to post even more vacancies.
This work builds on the literature that addresses the Shimer puzzle (Shimer,
2005; Constain & Reiter, 2008) by studying the amplifying effects of sluggish wages
on job creation.8 This literature is large; some examples are: Blanchard and Gali
(2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014), Elsby (2009), Gertler and
Trigari (2009), Hall (2005), Kennan (2009), Menzio (2005), and Venkateswaran
(2013). This chapter differs in at least three aspects with respect to this literature.
First, I propose a new mechanism for sticky wages based on workers that face
information frictions regarding aggregate variables. This mechanism, in contrast
to the previous literature, does not rely on any assumption about the persistence
of aggregate shocks (Menzio, 2005) or the distribution of firms (Kennan, 2009).9
In contrast to Venkateswaran (2013), I show that assuming firms face information
frictions does not generate sticky wages but can amplify the unemployment response
to productivity shocks.10 As in Menzio (2005) and Kennan (2009), what drives sticky
8There are alternative sources of fluctuations that increase unemployment volatility that are not
studied in this chapter. For example, den Haan, Ramy, and Watson (2000) show that endogenous
job destruction increases the response of unemployment to productivity shocks, and Carlsson and
Westermark (2015) point out that sticky wages for job stayers may increase the strength of this
channel. Similarly, recent literature has pointed out that sticky wages for job stayers may increase
the unemployment volatility if firms face financial frictions (Schoefer, 2015) or if labor effort is
variable (Bils, Chang & Kim, 2014), even though sticky wages for continuing workers do not
directly affect vacancy decisions in their models.
9Menzio (2005) and Kennan (2009) derive endogenous sticky wages based on firms that have
private information about their labor productivity. In Menzio (2005), aggregate shocks cannot be
very persistent. Otherwise, workers would demand higher wages. In Kennan’s model, the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic productivity cannot be large.
10Venkateswaran (2013) assumes firms that face information frictions regarding aggregate vari-
ables. In his model, after a positive productivity shock, firms do not offer higher wages because
they partially attribute aggregate shocks to idiosyncratic conditions, which makes firms post more
vacancies.
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wages in my model is the fact that workers are willing to work for wages that do
not adjust to the true state of the economy. That is, it is not enough to explain
why firms offer wages that are very persistent; workers need to be willing to accept
them.
A second difference of this chapter with respect to the previous literature
is that my model is able to generate significant unemployment volatility in spite
of the procyclicality of the flow opportunity cost of employment (FOCE), which
is the sum of the foregone unemployment benefits and the foregone value of non-
working activities valued in terms of consumption. According to Chodorow-Reich
and Karabarbounis (2014), the FOCE is very procyclical, which weakens or breaks
down the results of influential papers such as Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008).11 This point is also related to the argument of Brugemann
and Moscarini (2010) that assuming rent rigidities (wages in excess of the value of
unemployment) can account for at most 20% of the volatility in the job-finding rate.
In this chapter, even though the FOCE is procyclical, I still find significant responses
of labor market quantities to shocks. This is due to the timing of the model and
the real part of the information friction. Given that households make consumption
and saving decisions based on the same information friction, investment (capital
accumulation) absorbs most of the shock in the initial periods, which prevents con-
sumption and the FOCE from increasing. Hence, even though the FOCE eventually
rises, it takes time because workers (not firms) have information frictions regarding
11The Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014) critique extends to all papers that assume a
fixed and therefore acyclical FOCE, including Menzio (2005) and Kennan (2009).
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aggregate variables. To test this assumption, I show that my model predicts dynam-
ics for investment that are consistent with the data and does a good job matching
business cycle moments for consumption.
Finally, in contrast to previous literature, this chapter looks at the distribu-
tional implications of productivity shocks. I show how and why high-wage firms ex-
pand employment the most during an expansion and how this mechanism generates
different wage dynamics across firms. In this chapter, even though the information
friction is the same for all agents, wages at low-paying firms are less sensitive to the
business cycle than wages at high-paying firms. This is a result that other models
with sticky wages are unable to reproduce. In fact, in a standard New-Keynesian
model, a higher cyclicality of wages at high-wage firms would indicate a lower degree
of overall wage rigidity.
This chapter is also related to the literature about information frictions. This
chapter is close in spirit to Lucas (1972), where agents’ inability to distinguish
between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks generates money non-neutrality. Fol-
lowing Angeletos and La’O (2012) the information friction presented in this chapter
has both a nominal and a real part. That is, noisy information about aggregate
conditions affects not only price (wage) decisions, but also real allocations (saving,
consumption). As explained above, the real part of the information friction plays
an important role in explaining the dynamics of the model. Even though this infor-
mation structure seems exogenous, paying limited attention to aggregate shocks is a
standard result in the rational inattention literature that started with Sims (2003).
For example, Mackowiak and Wiederhold (2009) present a model in which agents
11
optimally decide to receive a noisy signal about aggregate conditions, as I assume in
this chapter, because acquiring information is costly. Similarly, Acharya (2014) and
Reis (2006a, 2006b) show that agents optimally decide to update their information
set sporadically when they face a cost of acquiring and processing information.
Finally, this chapter is related to the literature that studies the cyclicality of
wages over the business cycle. On the one hand, many studies conclude that the
degree of wage cyclicality is small, based in part on empirical evidence suggesting
that nominal wages adjust, on average, every 4 quarters in the U.S. (e.g. Kahn,
1997; Barattieri, Basu & Gottschalk, 2014).12,13 However, Pissarides (2009) argues
that vacancy decisions depend only on the wage for new hires and points out that
the wage elasticity with respect to unemployment for new hires is around -3%, in
comparison with an elasticity of -1% for job stayers. The Pissarides critique has been
recently challenged by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2014), who argue that the
evidence presented by Pissarides is based only on job changers. Using PSID data,
Gertler et al (2014) do not find that wages for new workers are more procyclical
than wages for job stayers and find that the wage elasticity for job changers with
respect to unemployment is -1.7%, which they argue is driven by changes in match
quality.14 Whether or not wages for new hires are more procyclical than wages for
12For example, Christiano et al (2013) argue that a “successful model must have the property that
wages are relatively insensitive to the aggregate state of the economy” (p, 3). Similary, Abraham
and Haltiwanger (1995) find that the relation between aggregate wages and output does not always
seem to be contemporaneous. They conclude that it is not possible to say whether real aggregate
wages are procyclical or not and that in general the cyclicality is small.
13In contrast to other countries, there is no seasonal pattern in wage adjustments in the U.S. Le
Bihan, Montornes and Heckel (2012), Lunnemann and Wintr (2009), and Sigurdsson and Sigurdar-
dottir (2011) present evidence of nominal wage adjustment for France, Luxembourg and Iceland
that exhibits seasonal patterns.
14They do not find that wages for job changers are more procyclical than wages for job stayers
when they include match fixed effects.
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existing workers is still an open question and is beyond the scope of this chapter.15
Nevertheless, I use CPS microdata in order to construct the average wages for job
stayers and new hires (adjusted for composition effects) and assess the predictions
of my model. It is worth noting that in my model wages for new hires are flexible
and I show that my model is able to reproduce a wage elasticity with respect to
unemployment for new hires and job changers of around -3%, which is not a target
in my calibration.16 Hence, this chapter points out that wage flexibility for new hires
does not imply that wages adjust immediately to the true state of the economy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: I present my model in Section
2 and explain its numerical solution in Section 3. Section 4 presents quantitative
analysis. First, I look at the data for the U.S., estimate the fraction of the business
cycle moments that can be explained by TFP shocks, and compute the business
cycle dynamics of some relevant variables after an aggregate productivity shock.
Then, I calibrate my model and compare the model’s predictions with my empirical
analysis. In Section 5, I discuss some alternative issues and extensions, and Section
6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
The model presented in this section is, in many aspects, similar to a stan-
dard real business cycle model with search and matching in the labor market as in
15For example, Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger (2001) argue that much of the cyclicality of wages
estimated by Solon, et al (1994) comes from weighting the data by hours worked.
16Based on their empirical results, Gertler et al (2014) build a model in which the wage elasticity
of job changers is driven by changes in match quality. Menzio and Shi (2011) also present a model
in which job to job transitions are driven by random match quality.
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Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). I introduce job changers in this model follow-
ing the theoretical framework of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) and Burdett
and Mortensen (1998). The main difference of my model with respect to the rele-
vant literature is that workers face information frictions about aggregate conditions.
As in Lucas (1972), workers form expectations about current aggregate economic
conditions based on noisy signals.
1.2.1 Model Overview
There are two types of agents in this economy, households and firms. There
is a representative household in the economy made up of a continuum of workers
that supplies capital and labor to firms and owns all firms in the economy. The
household derives utility from consumption and leisure and discounts future utility
at rate β. Capital is supplied in a perfectly competitive market at the capital
rental rate r and depreciates at rate δk, while labor supply is subject to search
frictions. I assume complete consumption insurance, which implies that workers seek
to maximize income for the household. A worker can be employed or unemployed at
each point in time. Unemployed workers receive unemployment compensation b and
are matched with a firm with probability q. Employed workers are separated from
their job with exogenous probability δh, in which case they must spend at least one
period in unemployment before they can be matched with another firm. Employed
workers can search on the job. An employed worker is matched with another firm
with probability ī · q, where ī is the search intensity of employed workers relative to
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unemployed workers and is fixed. However, employed workers only change jobs if
they find a firm that offers an equal or better wage.
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j with mass normalized to 1. All
firms produce a homogeneous good that is sold in a competitive market to the house-
hold and can be used for consumption or capital accumulation. A priori the only
difference among firms is their (permanent) total factor productivity (TFP) level,
which is denoted by aj. Without loss of generality, I assume that aj is increasing
in j. Hence, ax ≥ ay for all x ≥ y. As in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), the
most productive firms pay higher wages and are larger in equilibrium.17 Firms pro-
duce with capital kj and labor hj, through a concave production function. Firms’
output is denoted by yj = e
aj+akαj h
1−α
j ; where a stands for aggregate TFP, which is
common to all firms. At the beginning of each period, firms rent capital and open
new vacancies, vj. A vacancy is matched with a worker with probability q̃. If a
vacancy is matched with an unemployed worker, the vacancy is filled with proba-
bility 1. However, if a vacancy is matched with an employed worker, the vacancy is
filled only if the worker is coming from a less productive firm. As is standard, new
workers (filled vacancies) become productive in the subsequent period. In order to
avoid biasing my results in favor of high-wage firms, I assume a hiring cost of the
17While there is evidence in favor of a positive relationship between firm size and wages (e.g.
Brown & Medoff, 1989; Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, 2008), there is also evidence indicating that
firm age is important as well for understanding differences in cyclical behavior across firms (e.g.
Haltiwanger, Jarmin & Miranda 2013; Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda 2013). In particular,
Haltiwanger et al. (2015) point out the importance of classifying firms by wage instead of size.
This chapter abstracts from firm entry and exit. Hence, even though in this chapter larger firms
are more productive and pay higher wages, it is possible to think about the firm’s size in the long






1+χ, where χ > 0 and q̃j is the job filling rate for firm j.
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The total number of matches in the economy m(v, s) is an increasing function
in the total number of vacancies (v =
∫ 1
0
vjdj) and the total number of job searchers
(s = u +
∫ 1
0
(1 − δh)̄ihjdj, where u = 1 −
∫ 1
0
hjdj is the number of unemployed
workers). Following the literature, m(v, s) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree
1. Hence, q = m(θ, 1) and q̃ = m(1, θ−1) where θ = v/s is labor market tightness.
Firms and workers negotiate wages, wj, each period in order to split the ex-
pected match surplus according to a simple game: firms make a wage offer that can
be accepted or rejected, in the latter case workers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
firms with exogenous probability ϑ. Hence, in steady state, ϑ is the fraction of the
match surplus that goes to workers.
The only source of aggregate uncertainty is aggregate total factor productivity
a, which follows an AR(1) process. However, a is not directly observed by workers
in this economy. Instead, every period there is a public and noisy signal â about
the current level of aggregate TFP. This signal is observed by workers and firms,
and this is common knowledge. Based on the expectations derived from this signal,
workers make wage demands (in a sense that will be explained below) and the house-
18Assuming a vacancy posting cost instead would disproportionally affect low-wage firms, as
they have to post even more vacancies in expansions as a consequence of a larger decline in their
job filling rate. However, in the context of this model, assuming a hiring cost function does not
imply that vacancy decisions do not depend on labor market conditions. On the contrary, job-to-
job transitions induce changes in the separation rate within firms that significantly influence the
value of a new vacancy. Pissarides (2009) argues that hiring costs are a plausible assumption and
discusses how assuming hiring rather than vacancy costs may change the results in the standard
model. However, I show that my calibrated model with perfect information does not do a good job
matching the unemployment and wage dynamics observed in the data. On the other hand, Gertler
and Trigari (2009) and Gertler et al. (2014) assume a quadratic cost of adjusting employment in
order to ensure a determinate equilibrium. I prefer a hiring cost over a cost of adjusting employment
as a hiring cost does not bias my results in favor of high-wage firms. However, my results are not
sensitive to assuming a cost of adjusting employment.
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hold makes consumption/savings decisions. Even though workers do not perfectly
observe aggregate TFP, the idiosyncratic TFP level aj for each firm is public infor-
mation. In the benchmark model, firms have perfect information about aggregate
productivity.19
The timing of the model each period is as follows:
1. Aggregate TFP is realized.
2. The public signal is received and workers form expectations.
3. Wages are negotiated.
4. Firms rent capital and post vacancies.
5. Production takes place, and factors are paid.
6. The household makes a consumption decision based on the beliefs derived from
the signal â.
7. A fraction (1 − δh)̄iq of employed workers at firm j is matched with another
firm, a fraction q of unemployed workers finds a new job, and a fraction δh of
employed workers are endogenously separated from their jobs.
8. A fraction (1− δh)̄iqFj of employed workers leaves firm j to join another firm,
where Fj is the probability for firm j’s employees of being matched with a firm
with higher aj.
19In section 1.5.2, I show that my results are reinforced when firms also face information frictions.
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1.2.2 Household
There is a representative household made up of a continuum of members with
mass normalized to 1.20 The household is the owner of all firms in the economy,
and it supplies capital and labor to firms. Capital is supplied in a perfectly compet-
itive market at the rental rate r, while labor supply is subject to search frictions. I
assume complete consumption insurance, which implies that workers seek to max-
imize income for the household. Consumption and savings decisions are made at
the household level, but household members make their decisions based on the same
information set Ih. Throughout this chapter, EIh [x] is the expected value of x
conditional on the information set Ih, and E [x] is the expectation conditional on
perfect information.
1.2.2.1 Consumption and Saving
Consumption and savings decision are made at the household level in order to









dj + βE [U (ω′,Ω′)] (1.1)
subject to the budget constraint (1.2) and a perceived law of motion for the
20For expositional purposes, I derive in this section the value of employment and unemployment
based on the model assumptions. For a detailed derivation of these value functions as in Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996), see appendix A.3.
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economy (1.3):






πjdj + b · u− T (1.2)
Ω′ =λh(Ω) (1.3)
where ′ denotes next period’s value. ω = {k, {hj}1j=0, Ih} is the vector of state
variables for the representative household, and Ω is a vector that summarizes the
aggregate state of the economy. c is consumption, k is capital, wj is the wage paid
by firm j, and πj stands for firm j’s profits. u =
∫ 1
0
(1 − hj)dj is the total number
of unemployed workers, and b is unemployment compensation, which is financed by
lump sum taxes (T = b · u). The household and its members form expectations
based on their information set Ih and on a perceived law of motion for the economy






This leads to the first order condition for consumption:
c−σ = βEIh
[
(1− δ + r′)c′−σ
]
(1.4)
It is worth noting that the consumption decision is also affected by information
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frictions because the expectation in equation (1.4) is conditional on the information
set Ih. In other words, information frictions affect not only the wage bargaining
process as described in section 1.2.5, but also real allocations.21 To the extent that
aggregate shocks are partially perceived, the household will respond to productivity
innovations by accumulating capital in an attempt to smooth consumption through
time. As a result, the marginal disutility of labor (in terms of consumption) does
not increase, which prevents wages from going up. This mechanism will be clear in
section 1.2.5.
1.2.2.2 Workers
A worker can be employed or unemployed at each point in time. Unemployed
workers receive unemployment compensation b and are matched with a firm with





, where v is the total number of vacancies in the economy and vj stands
for firm j’s vacancies. Hence, the value of unemployment U(ω,Ω) is given by:



















is the stochastic discount factor between this and the next
period and Wj(ω,Ω) is the value of employment at firm j. Meanwhile, employed
workers are separated from their job with exogenous probability δh, in which case
they have to spend at least one period in unemployment before they can be matched
21Following the terminology of Angeletos and La’O (2012), the information friction is real since
it affects both prices and real allocations.
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with another firm. Following Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), I assume that
employed workers can search on the job. In particular, an employed worker at
firm j is matched with another firm with probability ī · q. However, I assume that
employed workers only change jobs if they find a firm that offers an equal or better
wage. Throughout this chapter, I refer to jobs that pay higher wages as better jobs.22
Hence, the value of employment at firm j is given by:
Wj(ω,Ω) = wj −Ψ
hξj
c−σ










The first line in equation (1.6) is the net flow income of a worker employed
at firm j. The second term (Ψ
hξj
c−σ
) is the value of non-working activities (or the
marginal disutility of labor) in terms of consumption, which is derived from the
household’s utility function (1.1). The second line in equation (1.6) says that with
probability (1 − δh)(1 − īq) a worker is not exogenously separated from firm j and
is not matched with another firm. The third line captures that with probability
(1−δh)̄iq a worker is not exogenously separated from firm j, is matched with another
firm, and picks the firm that gives her the higher continuation value. Finally, with
probability δh a worker becomes unemployed.
Given that only weakly better jobs are accepted, max{Wj(ω,Ω),Wx(ω,Ω)} =
22As explained in section 1.2.3, firms with higher idiosyncratic productivity pay higher wages.
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Wx(ω,Ω) ∀x ≥ j. Therefore, combining equations (1.5) and (1.6):
(Wj(ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω)) = wj − zj
+ E{Q((1− δh)(1− īqFj)(Wj(ω′,Ω′)− U(ω′,Ω′))






Following Hall and Milgrom (2008), I define zj as the flow-opportunity cost of
employment for firm j. Fj is the probability of finding a weakly better job than j,
W̃j(ω
′,Ω′) is the expected value of the new job for job changers leaving firm j, and
W̄ (ω′,Ω′) is the expected value of a new job for unemployed workers. These terms
in turn satisfy:






























Notice that the net value of employment (Wj(ω,Ω)−U(ω,Ω)) is a decreasing
function in zj and therefore in consumption. An increase in consumption makes
zj go up and reduces the net value of employment. As a consequence, wages must
increase when consumption increases in order to compensate workers for the decline
22
in the value of employment.
Chorodow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014) find empirically that the flow op-
portunity cost of employment (zj) is pro-cyclical and conclude that this procyclical-
ity undermines the results of previous papers attempting to solve the unemployment
volatility puzzle. A similar point is made by Brugemann and Moscarini (2010), who
argue that rent rigidity, defined as the fraction of wages that do not depend on
zj, can account for at most 20% of the volatility in the job-finding rate. How-
ever, notice that in this chapter information frictions reduce the sensitivity of zj to
productivity shocks. As explained above, to the extent that aggregate shocks are
partially perceived, the household will respond to positive productivity innovations
by accumulating capital in an attempt to smooth consumption through time, which
prevents zj from increasing.
Finally, notice that the expectations in equations (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7) are
not conditional on the household’s information set Ih. Instead, the expectations
are conditional on perfect information. This is because equations (1.5) and (1.6)
describe what a worker will actually receive in expectation and not what workers
expect to receive. However, workers will have to form expectations about Wj(ω,Ω)
and U(ω,Ω) in order to negotiate wages as described in section 1.2.5.
1.2.3 Firms
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j with a mass normalized to 1. Firms
produce with capital and labor, and their output can be used for consumption or
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for capital accumulation. At the beginning of each period, firms rent capital and
open new vacancies, v. A vacancy is matched with a worker with probability q̃. As
is standard in the literature, a filled vacancy becomes productive in the subsequent
period. However, not all matches become productive. If a vacancy is matched with
a worker that is currently employed at a better job, the match is dissolved. Hence,
denoting q̃u as the probability of filling a vacancy with an unemployed worker and
q̃cj as the probability of filling a vacancy with a job changer, the job filling rate for
firm j (q̃j) is given by:
q̃j = q̃
u + q̃cj (1.12)













Notice that q̃u is the same for all firms. By contrast, the job filling rate
varies across firms even though the probability of a match (q̃) is the same for all
firms. q̃cj and q̃j are higher for the most productive firms. As a consequence, low-
productivity firms rely more on the pool of unemployed workers. Hence, in an
expansion, low-wage firms find it more difficult to fill a vacancy and to retain a
worker than high-wage firms.
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The problem for firm j is given by:




















h′j = (1− δh)(1− īqFj)hj + q̃jvj (1.18)
Ω′ = λf (Ω) (1.19)
vj, kj ≥ 0 (1.20)
where a stands for aggregate TFP, which is common to all firms. ωf = {hj}
is the vector of state variables for firm j, and equation (1.19) is the perceived
law of motion for the economy. Denoting marginal labor productivity by pj =
(1−α)eaj+akαj h−αj , the first order conditions with respect to vj and kj are given by:
vj : − κ(q̃jvj)χ + E
[











− r = 0 (1.22)
where Jj(ωj,Ω) is the firm’s value of an additional worker, or the continuation
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Jj(ωf ,Ω) = pj − wj + E
[
Q · (1− δh)(1− īqFj) · Jj(ω′f ,Ω′)
]
(1.24)
Notice that even though the exogenous separation rate δh is the same for all
firms, the total separation rate varies across firms. If we define δhj = 1−(1−δh)(1−
īqFj) as firm j’s total separation rate, we can see that low-wage (less-productive)
firms have higher separation rates. Given that Fj is lower for more productive
firms, δhj is also lower for the most productive firms. Note that even though I am
not assuming a cost per vacancy posted, labor market conditions affect the value
a new vacancy through the firm specific separation rate δhj. It will be shown that
low-wage firms experience a larger increase in separations (quits) in expansions than
high-wage firms. Hence, the value of a new worker increases less for less-productive
firms in expansions.
1.2.4 Information Sets
I assume that workers (households) face information frictions in the sense that
they do not perfectly know the current value of aggregate TFP (a), which is the only
source of aggregate uncertainty. I assume that there is a public signal (â), based on
which workers form expectations. I assume that this public signal is also observed
by firms, so that workers’ beliefs are common knowledge. The public signal and
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aggregate productivity are related as follows:
â = a+ n (1.25)
where n is the noise of the signal. The aggregate TFP (a) and the noise (n) are
assumed to follow two independent AR(1) processes. I interpret the autocorrelation
in this noise as waves of optimism or pessimism:
a′ = ρa · a+ e′a; ea ∼ N(0, ςa) (1.26)
n′ = ρn · n+ e′n; en ∼ N(0, ςn) (1.27)
In order to formally define the equilibrium of this economy and find the solution
of this model, I have to assume that workers can perfectly observe the state of the
economy with a lag of T periods where T is a large integer. Hence, the information
set for the representative household is given by:
Ih = {âT ,Ω−T } (1.28)
where âT represents the last T realizations of â, and Ω−T is the value of the
vector Ω T periods ago. This information set does not mean that the representative
household does not perceive new productivity shocks at all. On the contrary, workers
form expectations about current and future economic conditions based on Bayes’ rule
and this information set, in order to make their decisions. This assumption about
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information implies that aggregate shocks are partially perceived by workers, who
learn slowly about productivity innovations as time elapses while simultaneously
continuing to receive positive or negative signals. Hence, if workers do not have
enough information to conclude that the economy is in an expansionary path, they
will not demand higher wages. Further, partial perception of aggregate shocks causes
c and zj to become more persistent, another avenue through which wage increases
are muted somewhat.
Not surprisingly, empirical evidence suggests that agents do not form expecta-
tions based on perfect information. For example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012)
find that the expectations of firms, households, and central banks are more consis-
tent with a model in which agents receive noisy signals about aggregate conditions,
as is assumed in this chapter.
1.2.5 Wages
I assume that wages are completely flexible and are negotiated at the start of
every period according to a simple game, through which firms and workers bargain
over the match surplus (Sj):
Sj = Jj(ωf ,Ω) +Wj(ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω) (1.29)
Notice that wj appears in functions Jj(ωf ,Ω) and Wj(ω,Ω) in accordance with
equations (1.24) and (1.6). However, since wj is an endogenous variable, it is not
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written as an argument for these functions.23 For expositional purposes, I will abuse
notation slightly in this section and define functions
−→





J j(w, ωf ,Ω) = pj − w + E
[




W j(w, ω,Ω) = w −Ψcσhξj
+ E{Q((1− δh)(1− īqF j)Wj(ω′,Ω′)
+ (1− δh)̄iqFjW̃j(ω′,Ω′) + δhU(ω′,Ω′))} (1.31)
Function
−→
J j(w, ωf ,Ω) can be interpreted as the value of a filled vacancy for
an arbitrary wage w.
−→
W j(w, ω,Ω) is interpreted similarly.
24 As a consequence,
functions
−→
J j(w, ωf ,Ω) and Jj(w, ωf ,Ω) are related as follows:
J(ωf ,Ω) =
−→
J j(wj, ωf ,Ω) (1.32)
W (ω,Ω) =
−→
W j(wj, ω,Ω) (1.33)
where wj is the wage that holds in equilibrium.
23In contrast, the match surplus is independent of wj .
24Notice that I do not index w in equations (1.30) and (1.31) by firms j in order to distinguish
between an arbitrary wage w and the equilibrium wage wj . On the other hand, notice that the
match surplus does not depend on w:
−→
J j(w,ωf ,Ω) +
−→
W j(w,ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω) ≡ Jj(ωf ,Ω) +Wj(ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω) = Sj
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1.2.5.1 Wage negotiation
Wages in this economy are negotiated according to the following game:
1. The firm offers a wage x to the worker.
2. The worker observes the firm’s offer. Upon acceptance, the game ends with
payoffs of
−→
W j(x, ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω) to the worker and
−→
J j(x, ωf ,Ω) to the firm.
3. If the worker rejects the firm’s offer, the match is destroyed with exogenous
probability 1 − ϑ (with payoffs to both agents of 0); otherwise, the worker
demands a wage y.
4. The firm observes this demand. Upon acceptance, the game ends with payoffs
of
−→
W j(y, ω,Ω) − U(ω,Ω) for worker and
−→
J j(y, ωf ,Ω) for firm. If the firm
rejects the worker’s offer, the game ends with payoffs of zero for both agents.
The extensive-from representation of this game is given in Figure 1.1.
1.2.5.2 Equilibrium Wage and Discussion
Even though this model assumes information frictions, an important bench-
mark is the case in which all agents have perfect information. In this spirit, the
following lemma establishes the equilibrium of this game under perfect information,
which will be used to compare the results under information frictions.
Lemma 1. If all agents in the economy have complete and perfect information, the
following strategy profiles constitute the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
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Figure 1.1: Wage Determination Game
Firm offers a wage equal to x
(−→
J j(x, ωf ,Ω),
−→
W j(x, ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω)
)A
Nature
Worker demands a wage equal to y
(−→
J j(y, ωf ,Ω),
−→








Note: This figure shows the extensive-form representation of the wage determination
game. Firms and workers bargain over the match surplus (Sj) by making wage
offers/demands. Details are provided in the text.
of this game:
• For the worker:




U(ω,Ω) = ϑ · Sj
– To demand a wage equal to y∗ such that
−→
W j(y
∗, ω,Ω)−U(ω,Ω) = Sj and
−→
J j(y
∗, ωf ,Ω) = 0.
• For the firm:
– To offer x∗.
– To accept only wage demands that are less than or equal to y∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1
Hence, under perfect information, the solution to this game coincides with the
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solution to the Nash-Bargaining game when the worker’s bargaining power is equal
to ϑ. Therefore, I will call ϑ the long-term bargaining power of workers.
Now, before characterizing the solution to this game with information frictions,
the following lemmas tell us that, in equilibrium, firms cannot credibly communicate
the true state of the economy to the workers.
Lemma 2. Suppose that agents are information-constrained as described in section
1.2.4. If there is an equilibrium in which firms’ strategy is to reveal the aggregate
state of the economy, the best strategy for firms is the same strategy described in
Lemma 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2
Lemma 3. If agents in the economy are information-constrained as described in sec-
tion 1.2.4, then in equilibrium, firms do not follow a strategy in which they perfectly
reveal the true state of the economy.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3
Even though Lemmas 2 and 3 do not characterize the solution to this game,
they make clear that a solution in which firms reveal the true state of the economy is
not possible. The intuition is simple: firms have incentives to lie. Firms will always
be tempted to tell workers that aggregate productivity is lower than it actually is,
so wages can be lower. As a consequence, workers do not rely on firms’ offer to form
expectations about aggregate conditions. Before defining the solution for this game
with information frictions, I make the following assumption:
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Assumption 1. For all realizations of a and â,
−→
J j(x
∗∗, ωf ,Ω) ≥ 0 (1.34)






= ϑ · EIh [Sj] (1.35)
That is, if both parties agree upon a wage x∗∗ such that, according to the
worker’s information set, a fraction ϑ of the match surplus goes to the worker, the
firm still gets a positive payoff for all realizations of the true productivity and the
signal. I check that this assumption holds in my calibration. Next, the following
lemma presents the solution to this game.
Lemma 4. If agents in the economy are information-constrained as described in
section 1.2.4, the following strategy profiles constitute a Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium:
• For the worker:






= ϑ · EIh [Sj]
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• For the firm:
– To offer x∗∗.
– To accept only wage demands that are less than or equal to ỹ∗∗ such that
−→
J j(ỹ
∗∗, ωf ,Ω) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4
Notice that in equilibrium, wages are a function of what workers would have
demanded if given the chance, even though they do not get to make such a wage
demand in equilibrium. This is because, if firms anticipate that workers will ask
for a fraction X of their perceived match surplus, they will offer a wage such that
workers get ϑ · X of the match surplus. Notice that this result is common in the
literature. In the classical paper of Rubinstein (1982), there are no counter-offers in
equilibrium because the first player to move makes an offer that takes into account
what the other player would get in the second stage of the game. Similarly, Hall
and Milgrom (2008) and Christiano et al (2005) assume that wages are negotiated
according to an alternating wage offer game. In those papers, there are no counter-
offers in equilibrium because firms compensate workers for what they would get if
they had the chance to make a counter-offer.25 In this sense, this set-up introduces
25Similarly, Matejka and McKay (2012) derive a model in which goods’ prices are determined
by consumers’ beliefs when they face information frictions and firms have perfect information.
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information frictions in a tractable way, and the solution under perfect information
of this game is the same as the Nash bargaining solution with workers’ bargaining
power equal to ϑ.
Regarding the solution with information frictions, Lemma 4 is an important
result for this chapter. Given that firms have incentives to lie about true productiv-
ity (Lemma 3), workers will only use their own information set to assess wage offers.
Hence, wage demands will be based on information frictions. To the extent that
aggregate TFP shocks are partially perceived, wage demands will be less sensitive
to aggregate conditions because workers’ expectations are smoother than aggregate
shocks. Consequently, wages will be more sluggish under information frictions. No-
tice that assuming that firms face the same information friction would not affect
the solution to this game, and therefore would not affect how sensitive wages are to
productivity shocks. However, if firms observe their overall productivity (aj + a) at
all times in addition to the signal â but cannot distinguish between aggregate and
idiosyncratic TFP shocks, firms will partially attribute aggregate TFP innovations
to idiosyncratic conditions. In that situation, firms will tend to post even more
vacancies in expansions because, in addition to the effect of persistent wages, firms
will underestimate the increase in separations and the decline in the job filling rate.
This case is covered at the end of this chapter as an extension.
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1.2.6 Equilibrium
We can now characterize the vector that describes the aggregate state of the
economy as Ω = {k, {hj}1j=0, aT , âT }. As before, aT and âT refer to the last T
realizations of a and â.
Definition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is a list of
functions {U(ω,Ω), Wj(ω,Ω), U(ω,Ω), Πj(ωf ,Ω), Jj(ωf ,Ω)} [Value Functions],
{{wj(Ω)}1j=0, Q(Ω), r(Ω)} [Prices], {{hj(ωf ,Ω), kj(ωf ,Ω), vj(ωf ,Ω), πj(ωf ,Ω),
W̃j(ω,Ω), zj(Ω)}1j=0, W̄ (ω,Ω), c(ω,Ω), k(ω,Ω), y(Ω), s(Ω), θ(Ω)}[Allocations],
{{q̃j(Ω), q̃cj(Ω), Fj(Ω)}1j=0, q(Ω), qu(Ω)}[Probabilities], and {λ, λf , λc}[Law of mo-
tion] such that given a law of motion for {â, a, n}[Exogenous variables]
• The representative household and workers optimize: Taking as given prices,
probabilities and a perceived law of motion for the economy (1.3), c(ω,Ω),
k′(ω,Ω) satisfy optimality condition (1.4) and the household’s budget con-
straint (1.2).
• Firms optimize: Taking as given prices, probabilities and a perceived law of
motion for the economy (1.19), vj(ωf ,Ω), kj(ωf ,Ω), and hj(ωf ,Ω) satisfy op-
timality conditions (1.21), (1.22) and the law of motion for hj (A.4).
• Wages and the stochastic discount factor: Wages are a solution to wage bar-








• Consistency of value functions: value functions U(ω,Ω), Wj(ω,Ω), U(ω,Ω),
Πj(ωf ,Ω), and Jj(ωf ,Ω) are consistent with equations (1.1), (1.6), (1.5),
(1.15), and (1.24).
• Beliefs: at each point in time, workers’ beliefs are determined by their infor-
mation set Ih, their perceived law of motion for the economy (1.3), and Bayes’
rule.
• Law of motion: the household’s and firms’ decision rules imply a law of motion
for the economy (λ) that is consistent with the household’s and firms’ perceived
law of motion: λf = λh = λ.
• Probabilities: probabilities q̃j(Ω), q̃cj(Ω), Fj(Ω), qu(Ω), and q(Ω) are consistent
with equation (1.12), (1.14), (1.9), (1.13) and q(Ω) = m(v(Ω), s(Ω))/s(Ω).
• Allocations: πj(ωf ,Ω), yj(ωf ,Ω), zj(Ω), W̃j(ω,Ω), W̄ (ω,Ω) and θ(Ω) are con-




























• Exogenous variables: a, â, and n evolve according to equations (1.25), (1.26)
and (1.27).
1.3 Computation
In order to compute the solution to this model numerically, it is important to
find and determine a law of motion for the economy, based on which the household
forms expectations and makes decisions. This task may not be simple for a large
vector Ω, given a distribution of firms. Hence, I solve this model by combining the
solution method for heterogeneous agent models proposed by Reiter (2009) and the
Kalman Filter, which I used in a previous paper (Morales-Jiménez, 2014). In this
section, I explain intuitively the logic behind this method.
First, the Reiter method solves heterogeneous agent models by taking a first-
order approximation of the model around the deterministic steady state of the econ-
omy.26 Assume that the following system of equations describes the equilibrium of
the economy:
f(Ω,Ω′,Υ,Υ′,E) = 0 (1.36)
where Υ is the vector of endogenous variables of the economy and E is the
vector of exogenous shocks. The Reiter method then finds the solution in three
steps:
1. A finite representation of the economy is provided by discretizing the distri-
26For a detailed application of the Reiter method, see Costain and Nakov (2011).
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bution of agents.
2. The deterministic steady state of the economy is found by imposing E = 0
and finding the solution to:
f ∗ = f(Ω∗,Ω∗,Υ∗,Υ∗, 0) = 0 (1.37)
3. The model is linearized numerically around the steady state, which yields the
system of linear equations:
f ∗1 (Ω− Ω∗) + f ∗2 (Ω′ − Ω∗) + f ∗3 (Υ−Υ∗) + f ∗4 (Υ′ −Υ∗) + f ∗5E = 0 (1.38)
where f ∗i is the partial derivative of (1.37) with respect to its i-th argument.
This system is solved using a standard method such as Sims (2002) or Klein
(2000).
Hence, the Reiter method induces a law of motion for the economy of the form:
Ω′ = FΩ + E (1.39)
Υ = GΩ (1.40)
where F and G are matrices of coefficients. Therefore, the law of motion for the
economy is described by: λ = {F,G}. The challenge for a model with information
frictions comes from the fact that the law of motion λ is derived from a perceived
law of motion λh, which in equilibrium has to be equal to the actual law of motion
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λ.
I exploit the linearity of the Reiter method and proceed as follows:27
1. Define a tolerance level.
2. Guess a linear law of motion for the economy λh{1} = {Fh{1},Gh{1}}. A good
initial guess may be the law of motion of the model under perfect information.
3. Let the household form expectations based on this guess and the Kalman filter.
4. Find the solution of the model using the Reiter method, which is given by a
new law of motion λ{1} = {F{1},G{1}}.
5. If the maximum difference between λh{1} and λ{1} is less than the predeter-
mined tolerance level, stop and conclude that λh{1} = λ. Otherwise, update
the household’s perceived law of motion as follows:
λh{n+1} = d · λh{n} + (1− d) · λ{n}; 0 < d < 1 (1.41)
where d is a fraction that determines how smoothly the guess is updated.
6. Go back to step 3.
27The linearity of the model makes the model tractable as I can compute expectations based on
a linear filter. Otherwise, I would need to use non-linear filters (such as the particle filter), which
would substantially increase the complexity of the problem for a large vector Ω.
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1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I assess the model’s predictions in light of the empirical evidence
for the United States for the period 1964 to 2014. Before taking a look at the data, it
is important to highlight again two features of the model presented in this chapter.
First, the main driving force in the model is productivity shocks. As a consequence,
it would be incorrect to look only at the unconditional moments in the series, and I
should try to identify the fraction of the business cycle that is driven by aggregate
productivity shocks.28 Second, this is a business cycle model. Therefore, I should
detrend all U.S. variables in order to make a correct comparison with my model. In
order to do that, I follow the literature and filter all series (at quarterly frequency)
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 105.29
1.4.1 U.S. Data
I present business cycle statistics for the quarterly time series (seasonally ad-
justed) of unemployment, vacancies, output, consumption, investment, aggregate
TFP, and real wages (deflated by CPI) for job stayers, new hires, job changers
and new hires from non-employment.30 All variables are HP-filtered in logs with a
28For example, Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue that a significant fraction of unemployment
volatility is uncorrelated with productivity, and they estimate that 68% of unemployment volatility
is driven by productivity shocks. In their paper, productivity is measured by output per hour.
In this chapter, I measure productivity as the Solow residual computed by Basu, Fernald, and
Kimball (2006). In my model, labor productivity is an endogenous variable, in contrast to TFP,
which is the main driving force in the model.
29In the last section of this chapter, I discuss how my results change if I use a smoothing
parameter equal to 1,600. In general my results are not very sensitive to this parameter.
30New hires can be decomposed into two groups: new hires coming from unemployment and new
hires coming from other jobs (job changers).
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smoothing parameter of 105, which is a standard parameter in the literature.
Unemployment is the total number of unemployed people from the Current
Population Survey (CPS). Vacancies are the composite help-wanted index com-
puted by Barnichon (2010). Output is real output in the nonfarm business sector.
Aggregate productivity is measured as the Solow residual as computed by Basu,
Fernald, and Kimball (2006), which is available and updated at the website of the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Consumption consists of non-durable goods
and services. Finally, investment is real gross private domestic investment. I include
investment as a variable of interest because the impact of the information friction
on investment plays an important role in my model.
Given the debate about the cyclicality of wages, I use the CPS microdata to
construct the average wages for job stayers, new hires, job changers and new hires
from non-employment adjusted for composition effects. In order to compute these
wages, I follow Muller (2012) and Haefke et al. (2013) who also used the CPS
microdata to construct similar series. Denoting xit as a vector with individual level
characteristics such as education, experience, sex, occupation and industry, the wage
of individual i at time t (wit) is given by:
log(wit) = x
′
itβx + log(ŵit) (1.42)
where ŵit is the part of wages that does not depend on individual characteris-
tics, which may or may not depend on aggregate conditions. The average wage for
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whereG = {job stayers, job changers, new hires, new hires from non-employment},
and ωit is the sample weight for individual i, which is provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). Since 1994, the CPS has asked individuals whether or not
they still work at the same job as in the previous month, making it possible to iden-
tify job changers. However, it is not possible to identify job-to-job transitions prior
that year. In order to have similar samples, all results regarding wages by group
are restricted to the sample period 1994-2014. Appendix A.4 provides more details
about the CPS dataset, the methodology that I follow to construct wGt , and some
auxiliary regressions and discussion. Given that the literature usually measures
wages by the average hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory employees,
which is available since 1964, the results for this series can be found in Appendix
A.4 as well.
1.4.2 Business Cycle Statistics and TFP Shocks
Table 1.1 presents unconditional business cycle statistics. As has been previ-
ously documented in the literature, unemployment is one of the most volatile series.
Unemployment is 10 times more volatile than TFP, and 8 times more volatile than
output. Similarly, vacancies and the vacancy-unemployment ratio are also highly












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Empirical Impulse Responses to a 1% Increase in TFP
Note: This figure plots the impulse responses to a 1% increase in TFP from bivariate near-VARs with three lags, where TFP is assumed
to follow an exogenous AR(1) process. All variables are HP-filtered in logs using a smoothing parameter equal to 105. All figures are
expressed in percentage points. The x axis represents quarters after the TFP shock. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals
computed via bootstrap. The sample period is 1964Q1-2014Q4. The sample period for wages is 1994Q1-2014Q4.
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Since only a fraction of these moments can be accounted for by productivity
shocks, I follow the literature that investigates the effects of productivity innovations
in order to estimate the properties of the business cycle that is driven by TFP
shocks.31 Following Basu et al. (2006) and Gali (1999), I estimate bivariate near -
VARs. In particular, for each variable x, I estimate the following system of equations:
at = αa + ρa · at−1 + ea (1.44)
xt = αx +
3∑
i=1
ρix · xt−i +
3∑
i=0
βix · at−i + ext (1.45)
In the first equation, I regress TFP (a) on one lag of itself, which is an hy-
pothesis that cannot be rejected.32 The second equation regresses each variable x
on the current a and three lags of both itself and a.33 Based on this estimation, I
construct recursively the auxiliary variable x̃, which describes how variable x evolves
in response to TFP innovations:
x̃t = xt t ≤ 3 (1.46)
x̃t = αx +
3∑
i=1
ρix · x̃t−i +
3∑
i=0
βix · at−i t > 3 (1.47)
Table 1.2 presents business cycle statistics for these auxiliary variables.34 As
expected, the standard deviations are lower and most of the correlations become
31Examples in this literature are Barnichon (2010), Basu et al. (2006), Blanchard and Quah
(1989), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003, 2005), Gali (1999) and Shea (1998).
32Adding further lags does not improve explanatory power.
33This number of lags satisfies both the Akaike and Schwarz criteria.
34Table A.1 in appendix A.1 presents the standard deviation for these moments.
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stronger. In particular, I estimate that 76% of overall unemployment volatility is due
to productivity shocks. Similarly, around 70% of overall volatility in vacancies and
the vacancy-unemployment ratio can be explained by TFP. However, productivity
does not explain much of the observed volatility in wages. On average, productivity
explains 25% of the standard deviation of wages for all groups.
It is important to note that Table 1.2 reports only the conditional correlations
that are induced by TFP shocks. These conditional correlations represent the joint
responses of endogenous variables to TFP, not the causal impact of one variable on
the other. For example, Table 1.2 reports a strong, negative and significant condi-
tional correlation between unemployment and wages. That is to say, an increase in
wages is associated with a decrease in unemployment, which may sound counterin-
tuitive given that firms’ labor demand slopes down. However, this is exactly what
the model predicts will happen in response to TFP shocks. As will be shown below,
if productivity increases, wages increase because the marginal productivity of labor
increases and because firms find it more difficult to find and retain new workers.
Similarly, unemployment goes down in response to a higher productivity level be-
cause firms post more vacancies. Hence, TFP shocks induce a negative correlation
between wages and unemployment.
To close this section, Figure 1.2 plots the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
of the variables of interest to a 1% increase in aggregate TFP. Given that all of these
variables are in logs and HP-filtered, the responses are percentage deviations around
a trend and can be interpreted as elasticities. Some results from Figure 1.2 that
will be used to assess my model predictions include: (1) Unemployment, vacancies,
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and the vacancy-unemployment ratio are very sensitive to TFP shocks. In response
to a 1% increase in TFP, unemployment declines 6% while vacancies rise by 7%,
which implies that the vacancy-unemployment ratio increases 15%. (2) Responses
are hump-shaped, which means that the largest response of these variables does
not occur on impact. (3) Wages are positively correlated with TFP when they
are adjusted for composition effects. However, wage responses are not statistically
significant. (4) On average, wages peak 2 years (8 quarters) after a TFP shock, in
contrast to 1 year (4 quarters) for unemployment and vacancies. (5) Wage responses
to TFP shocks are very small in absolute value (less than 0.3%) in the first three
quarters.
1.4.3 Parameterization
I calibrate this model to quarterly frequency. I borrow the values for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ), the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply (ξ), and the output elasticity of labor (α) from previous literature and
set these parameters equal to 1, 0.5, and 0.33.35 Following the literature, I set ϑ
equal to 0.5, which implies equal bargaining power for workers and firms in steady
state. The unemployment benefit b is set to 0.041 following the evidence presented
by Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014).36 I set δ and β so that the annual
35Peterman (2013) reviews the Frisch elasticities used in macro models (between 2 and 4) and
estimates an elasticity for macro studies between 2.9 and 3.1, which implies a value of 0.33 for ξ.
In order to have a similar value to the standard literature, I set ξ=0.5, but a lower value would
make the results of this chapter stronger, as zj would become less cyclical.
36Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2014) estimate that unemployment benefits are 21.5% of
the marginal labor productivity. However, when adjusted by eligibility, claims and take up costs, b
declines to 0.041. Given that I will have a distribution of labor productivity, I take a conservative
approach, and I set b to 0.041% of the model marginal labor productivity, which is equal to 1.
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depreciation rate is equal to 10% and the annual interest rate is equal to 5% in
steady state.
Given firm heterogeneity in this model, it is important to have a matching
function that guarantees that all matching probabilities are between 0 and 1, which
is not the case for the widely used Cobb-Douglas function. Hence, I follow den Han,








I choose the parameter l so that the job-finding probability (q) is equal to
0.611 in steady state, which implies an average duration of unemployment equal to
15 weeks, consistent with evidence for the US economy. In steady state, the elasticity




) is equal to 0.454, which is in the
range reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The exogenous separation rate
δh is set such that the unemployment rate is equal to 5.5% in steady state.
I calibrate the distribution of the idiosyncratic TFP level (aj) such that: (1)





and (2) the mode of the distribution is 1. Hence, everything is term of
the mode (marginal) labor productivity across firms.37 The standard deviation of the
normal distribution is calibrated to 0.2, which is consistent with Long, Dziczek, Luria
37Given that the distribution of employment is not uniform across firms in equilibrium, the
median productivity across firms is not equal to the median productivity across workers.
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and Wiarda (2008).38 Based on the evidence presented by Kahn and McEntarfer
(2014), the extreme points of the distribution (p and p̄) are calibrated such that the
wage paid at the most productive firm is 5 times the wage paid at the least productive
firm. I discretize the distribution for aj into 101 points. As to hiring costs, I calibrate
the parameter χ to target the autocorrelation of aggregate vacancies, and κ is set
such that the total number of employed workers in steady state is equal to 0.945.




across firms is equal to 0.72, which is consistent with the value found by
Hall and Milgrom (2008).39 The value for ī is calibrated such that the number of
job changers per month in steady state is equal to 2.5% of the total population,
which is consistent with the estimates of Fallick and Fleischman (2004). Finally,
the persistence of aggregate TFP is calibrated to 0.95 and the standard deviation
to 0.018. Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), σn and ρn are calibrated
such that the persistence of the forecasting error is equal to 0.8 and workers give a
weight of 20% to new information. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 summarize the aforementioned
calibration parameters and their sources when appropriate.
1.4.4 Model versus Data
Before turning to the dynamics, I first present Figure 1.3, which illustrates
the role of heterogeneous firms in this model. Panel (a) plots the distribution of id-
38They report that the standard deviation of log productivity across firms was 0.657 in 1997,
while the median log productivity was 3.47. Hence, as a fraction of the median, the standard
deviation is approximately 0.2.
39There is an extensive debate surrounding the value of the flow opportunity cost of employment
(z) in the literature, with parameterizations ranging from 0.4 (e.g. Shimer, 2005) to 0.955 (e.g.
Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). A value around 0.72 is less controversial than these extremes.
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iosyncratic TFP across firms (f(aj)) and the marginal labor productivity associated
with each aj, and panel (b) shows the wage rate (wj) and the probability of finding
a better job conditional on a match for employed workers (Fj). We can see that
the most productive firms have higher marginal labor productivity and as a conse-
quence pay higher wages. Panel (c) shows the average firm size as a function of the
firm’s labor productivity p (solid black line), and the distributions of employment
(dashed line). In particular, the dashed black line in panel (c) plots the fraction
of workers that are currently employed in a firm with labor productivity equal to
pj. As in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) the most productive firms are larger
in equilibrium, and therefore the distribution of employment is shifted to the right
in comparison with the distribution for p.
Table 1.3: Parameters Externally Calibrated
Parameter Value Description
σ 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ξ 0.5 Inverse of Frisch elasticity
α 0.33 Labor share in production function
ρa 0.95 Persistence of productivity shocks
ςa 0.018 Standard deviation of productivity shocks
Notes: This table summarizes parameters that are externally calibrated.
Details are reported in section 1.4.3.
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Table 1.4: Parameters Internally Calibrated
Parameter Value Description Target
aj Idiosyncratic TFP distribution Marginal labor productivity distributed
truncated normal with mean 1, standard de-
viation 0.2 and truncated range (0.5,2).
b 0.041 Unemployment benefits Fraction of b over modal (marginal) labor
productivity = 0.041.




ςn 5 · ςa Signaling parameter Weight on new information = 20%.
δh 0.0356 Exogenous separation rate Unemployment rate= 5.5%
ρn 0.8 Signaling parameter Persistence of forecasting error = 0.85.
l 4 Matching function parameter Unemployment duration ≈ 15 weeks.
κ 0.8416 Hiring cost function parameter Total employment = 0.945.
ī 0.6 Relative search intensity of
employed workers
Fraction of job changers = 2.5%/month
β 0.9879 Discount factor Annual interest rate = 5%
χ 0.6 Hiring cost function convexity Persistence of vacancy index.
δk 0.026 Capital depreciation rate Annual depreciation rate = 10%.
Notes: This table summarizes the parameters that were internally calibrated. Details are reported in section 1.4.3.
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Panel (d) plots the separation rate (δhj) and the job filling rate (q̃j) associated
with each level of marginal labor productivity. Since employed workers only accept
jobs that pay a higher wage and unemployed workers always accept a job offer, the
most productive firms have a higher job filling rate and a lower separation rate than
less-productive firms. This also implies that low-paying firms rely more on the pool
of unemployment while high-wage firms find most of their new hires from the pool
of employment. Hence, it is not surprising that the labor productivity distribution
of new workers (individuals that were unemployed in the previous period) is shifted
to the left relative to the productivity distribution of all firms, while the distribution
of job changers is shifted to the right (panel (e)) -new workers are more likely to
find a job in a low-paying firm, in contrast to job changers, who are poached by the
most productive firms.
In panel (f), we can also see that the distribution of overall employment is even
more shifted to the right than the distribution of job changers. This is because the
most productive firms have a low separation rate in equilibrium. In other words, a
firm at the right tail of the productivity distribution has a higher job filling rate but
also a lower separation rate than a firm at the middle of the distribution. Hence, a
very productive firm doesn’t have to post as many vacancies as a firm that is in the
middle of the distribution.
Based on these distributions, Table 1.5 reports the average wage for different
types of workers. The average wage for job stayers is higher than for any other
group. This is because high-paying firms have the lowest separation rate, which
gives a higher weight to employed workers at those firms. In contrast, the average
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Figure 1.3: Firm and Employment Distribution in Steady State
Note: This figure plots the distributions of employment and productivity across firms
in steady state along with the separation rate, job filling rate and wage associated
with each firm.
wage for new workers (hired from unemployment) is the lowest among these groups
of workers. As explained earlier, new workers are more likely to find a job at a
low-paying firm.
Table 1.5: Average Wages in Steady State
All workers Stayers New Hires Changers New Workers
1.1419 1.1563 1.0072 1.0827 0.8776
Notes: This table reports the average wage for different groups of workers in steady state.
Next, Figures 1.4 and 1.5 plot the Impulse Response Functions of the aggregate
variables of this model to a 1% increase in aggregate TFP (solid black lines). In
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order to isolate the role of information frictions, I simultaneously plot the IRFs
generated by a calibrated model in which agents have perfect information (dashed
lines). In addition, Figure 1.6 plots the IRFs for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and
90th percentiles of idiosyncratic productivity in the economy.
Based on these figures, we can see the role of information frictions in amplifying
the unemployment response to productivity shocks. Since TFP shocks are partially
perceived by workers, wages are less sensitive to aggregate productivity innovations
(Figure 1.4). In particular, the assumed information friction has two reinforcing
effects on wages. First, workers’ expectations are highly sluggish. Hence, in a
boom, workers do not demand a large increase in wages because they do not have
enough information to conclude that the economy has entered an expansionary path.
Second, given workers’ beliefs, consumption does not change significantly on impact,
so that a large fraction of the increase in aggregate output is absorbed by investment.
This curbs the increase of the flow of opportunity cost of employment (zj), which
makes wages even less responsive. Therefore, firms have more incentive to expand
employment because wages adjust slowly to the true state of the economy.
However, firms’ responses to this shock are not uniform. Actually, only the
most productive firms experience an expansion in employment as a consequence of
a positive aggregate TFP innovation. Since there is a large expansion in overall
employment, there is a large flow of job changers that makes the separation rate
increase for low-paying/less-productive firms. Hence, the value of a new hire is
affected by two countervailing effects. On the one hand, the productivity increase,
combined with sluggish real wages, tends to increase the value of an additional
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Function to a 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity
Note: This figure plots model Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to a 1% increase
in aggregate TFP. Solid black lines are the IRFs for a model in which workers face
information frictions, and dashed-lines are the IRFs generated by a model in which
all agents have perfect information.
worker for firms in an expansion. On the other hand, an increase in the separation
rate reduces the value of an additional worker because firms expect the match to
not last as long. Hence, the value of an additional worker should increase more for
highly-productive firms. Therefore, they expand employment the most. According
to these results, the increase in the separation rate for low-paying firms is so large
that they reduce their employment levels, as they are crowded out by the large
expansion of highly productive firms. This implies that the differential employment
growth rate between high and low paying firms is positive and procyclical, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g. Kahn & McEntarfer, 2014; Haltiwanger,
et al., 2015).
57
Figure 1.5: Impulse Response Function to a 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity
Note: This figure plots model Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to a 1% increase
in aggregate TFP. Solid black lines are the IRFs of a model in which workers face
information frictions, and dashed-lines are the IRFs generated by a model in which
all agents have perfect information. q, q̃, and q̃u denote the job finding rate, the
probability that a vacancy is matched with a worker, and the job filling rate (from
unemployment), respectively.
This differential growth rate in employment implies a differential growth in
the flow opportunity cost of employment (zj). Since high-paying firms are expand-
ing employment the most, they also experience a larger increase in zj, which makes
their wages increase more than the wages for low-paying firms. The fact that wages
increase more for the most productive firms does not imply that their workers have
more or better information than workers employed at low-paying firms. Since work-
ers can perfectly distinguish among firms and they know that high-productive firms
are more sensitive to the business cycle, employees at the most productive firms
demand a higher wage than employees at low-productive firms in response to an
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Figure 1.6: Distributional Dynamics to a 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity
Note: This figure plots the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for a model with
information frictions for different firms to a 1% increase in aggregate TFP. Solid gray
lines are the IRFs for firms at the 10th percentile of idiosyncratic TFP. The dashed-
gray lines are the IRFs for firms at the 25th percentile. The solid x-marked black
lines are the IRF for the median firm. The dashed black lines are the IRF for firms
at the 75th percentile, and the solid black lines are the IRFs for firms at the 90th
percentile. zj and Fj denote the flow opportunity cost of employment for firm j, and
the probability of finding a weakly better job than j, respectively.
increase in perceived productivity. Hence, the differential employment growth rate
occurs despite the larger adjustment in wages for high-paying firms, which is also
consistent with the empirical evidence. Kahn and McEntarfer (2014) do not find
that the differential employment growth rate is driven by high-paying firms facing
more sluggish wages. In fact, they show that high-paying firms reduce wages in
recessions relative to low-paying firms.
These results imply different dynamics for the job-filling rate across firms (q̃j).
In particular, since low-paying firms rely more on hiring from the pool of unemploy-
ment, they experience a large decline in q̃j because of the decline in unemployment.
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By contrast, high-paying firms experience an initial decrease in the job-filling rate
because of the large increase in the total number of vacancies. But as the pool
of employment increases, the job filling rate for the most productive firms goes up
because most of their new hires come from other firms.
Table 1.6 reports the business cycle statistics generated by a model in which
workers face information frictions. In particular, I simulate the model for 100,000
periods and detrend all variables using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter
of 105. To facilitate comparison, Table A.3 in Appendix A.1 compares the business
cycle moments generated by my model and those obtained from the data. Based on
my simulations, we can see that a model in which workers face information frictions
is able to explain 60% of the overall volatility of unemployment and around 70% of
the overall volatility in other labor market quantities. Compared to my empirical
estimates, my model is able to explain 90% of the unemployment volatility that
is attributable to TFP shocks. Similarly, my model does a good job in terms of
correlations, as the correlations predicted by the model are very close to those de-
rived from the data. It is also worth noting that my empirical exercise helps us to
reconcile some empirical inconsistencies of the search and matching model described
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011). In particular, they argue that the contempo-
raneous correlation between the vacancy-unemployment ratio and productivity is
significantly lower in the data than in the model and that the standard deviation of
wages is higher than the wage elasticity with respect to productivity. According to
my empirical analysis, conditioning on TFP shocks in the data increases the con-
temporaneous correlation between the vacancy-unemployment ratio and TFP from
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0.52 to 0.89 and reduces the standard deviation of wages from 0.08 to 0.02. My
calibrated model generates a correlation between the vacancy unemployment ratio
and TFP equal to 0.93 and a standard deviation of wages around 0.013.40
Figure 1.7 compares the IRFs estimated from the data with those generated by
the model. With the exception of the IRFs for output and consumption, the model is
able to explain very well the dynamics of these variables after a productivity shock.
Even though the IRF for output predicted by the model does not lie in the confidence
interval, the model is able to predict a hump-shaped response. It is worth noting
that, by construction, the model must predict an impact response equal to 1%. On
the other hand, even though my model predicts too large a consumption response,
it is worth noting that a calibrated model with perfect information shares this flaw.
Also, notice that a smaller consumption response (as in the data) would reinforce
my results on wages and unemployment, as the increase in the opportunity cost of
employment would be smaller (less cyclical). On the other hand, the model with
information frictions does a good job explaining the dynamics of both wages and
investment. Recall that the real part of the information friction plays an important
role in this model. Given that aggregate shocks are partially perceived by workers,
most of the shock is absorbed by investment (capital accumulation). These IRFs
tell us that the model does a good job of explaining the behavior of investment.
40Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011) also discuss an additional shortcoming: the correlation be-
tween vacancies and productivity is maximized when vacancies are led one or two quarters. My
model is consistent with this fact. However, this is because I assume a strictly convex hiring cost
function. Gertler and Trigari (2009) are also able to generate this pattern by assuming a quadratic




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.7: IRFs to 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity. Data versus Model
Note: The solid black lines in this figure plot the impulse responses to a 1% increase in TFP from bivariate near-VARs with three lags,
where TFP is taken to follow an exogenous AR(1) process. All variables are HP-filtered in logs using a smoothing parameter equal to 105.
All figures are expressed in percentage points. The x axis represents quarters after the TFP shock. The shaded area represents the 95%
confidence intervals computed via bootstrap. The sample period is 1964Q1-2014Q4. The sample period for wages is 1994Q1-2014Q4.
The dashed lines are the IRFs generated by a model with information frictions, and the dotted lines are the IRFs generated by a model
in which all agents have perfect information.
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Finally, the left panel of Figure 1.8 plots the IRF for average wages for each
type of worker in my benchmark model. Notice that the average wages for new hires,
job changers and new workers have a larger response on impact than the average
wages for job stayers and all workers. However, these differences are driven primarily
by heterogeneity across firms. To see this, note that average wages increase for two
reasons: (1) because wages within firms increase and (2) because high-wage firms
increase employment the most in an expansion. In order to see how important these
two effects are, the right panel of Figure 1.8 plots the average wage for all groups of
workers when wages are adjusted for this composition effect. In particular, I follow
Horrace and Oaxaga (2001) and define the average wage for group G adjusted for
composition effects (w̃G) as the average wage for a fixed composition of workers
across firms, where the composition of workers is given by the disribution of workers
across firms in steady state.
Figure 1.8: Wage Responses to a 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity
Note: This figure plots the evolution of the average wage for different
groups of workers in response to a 1% increase in aggregate productivity.
The left panel plots the evolution of average wages not adjusted for
composition effects. The right panel plots the evolution of average wages
adjusted for composition effects.
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By comparing the two panels of Figure 1.8, we can infer that the initial increase
in the wages of new hires, job changers and new workers is due almost entirely to
the large increase in employment at high-paying firms. However, when I control
for the fact that high wage firms expand employment the most, wages of all groups
have the same behavior -wage responses to aggregate shocks are gradual. Similarly,
when controlling for this composition effect, there are not significant differences in
wage responses for different groups of workers. This result is in line with previous
empirical evidence. For example, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2013) find no significant differences in the cyclicality of wages for job changers and
job stayers when they control for match quality.41
How does the wage flexibility in my model compare to the data? Pissarides
(2009) finds that the wage semi-elasticity with respect to the unemployment rate for
job changers is around -3% in comparison for -1% for job stayers.42 This evidence
has been cited by Pissarides and others in favor of models with flexible wages and
against models with sticky wages. In order to estimate this semi-elasticity in my
model, I simulated the model for 100,000 periods, computed the average wages for
all groups adjusted for composition effects and ran the following regression for each
41Gertler et al. (2014) find the same result for a different sample period using the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) dataset. Below, I discuss the consequences of assuming
sticky wages for job stayers.
42These numbers imply that an increase of one percentage point in unemployment (for example,
from 5 to 6%) makes wages for job changers and job stayers decrease by 3% and 1%, respectively.
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group:
log(w̃Gt ) = α0 + βu · urt + et (1.49)
where w̃Gt is the average wage (adjusted for composition effects) for group G.
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α0 is a constant, urt is the unemployment rate at time t, et is an error term, and βu
is the wage semi-elasticity with respect to the unemployment rate.
Table 1.7: Wage Semi-Elasticities With Respect To Unemployment Rate
Job Stayers New Hires Job Changers New Workers
-3.05 -3.08 -3.11 -2.97
Notes: This table presents the wage semi-elasticities with respect to the unemployment
rate generated by this model. Wages are adjusted for composition effects following the
methodology of Horrace and Oaxaga (2001).
This semi-elasticity is reported in Table 1.7 for job stayers, new hires, job
changers, and new workers. It is worth noting that these values are not a target in
my calibration, but we can see that they are all around -3%. That is, this model
is robust to the Pissarides critique. In my model, wages for new hires are flexible,
and wage semi-elasticities with respect to the unemployment rate are around -3%.
If these semi-elasticities were lower (in absolute terms) than -3%, as argued by
Gertler et al. (2014), my model predictions would be reinforced as wages would be
43As before, I control for composition effects following the methodology of Horrace and Oaxaga
(2001). The advantage of this methodology, in contrast to running a regression with firm dummies,
is that the results are independent of the excluded variable. Haefke et al. (2013) also discuss the
advantages of this methodology when constructing the average wage for new workers (production
and non-supervisory employees).
66
less cyclical, which would further increase firms’ incentives to expand employment.
However, it is worth pointing out that my model is not able to endogenously generate
a difference in the elasticity between job stayers and new hires. This is because all
wages are negotiated period by period. In the next section, I extend this model
by assuming that wages are negotiated at the moment in which new matches are
formed and once a year after that. However, this extension does not significantly
reduce the wage semi-elasticity for job stayers.
1.5 Robustness
This section addresses the robustness of my results to variations in some of the
assumptions that underlie my analysis. In particular, I will consider: (1) allowing
sticky wages for job stayers, (2) allowing firms to face information frictions, and (3)
allowing a different HP smoothing parameter in the data.
I show that: (1) In contrast to previous literature, assuming that wages for
job stayers are sticky amplifies the unemployment response to productivity shocks.
When workers negotiate wages for the following n periods, they give up using the
flow of information that they would otherwise receive for the next n periods, which
makes wages even more sluggish. (2) Assuming that firms face information frictions
reinforces my results, as firms underestimate the cost of recruiting new workers in
expansions and expand employment even more. (3) Using a smoothing parameter
equal to 1,600 makes wages less cyclical in the data and does not have a significant
impact on other variables.
67
1.5.1 Sticky Wages for Job Stayers
In contrast to previous literature in which the wage of job stayers is irrelevant
for vacancy decisions, assuming sticky wages for continuing workers amplifies the
unemployment response to productivity shocks in my model. If a worker has to
negotiate her wage for the following n periods, she gives up using the new information
she otherwise would be using in the future. To see this clearly, suppose that workers
observe everything with a lag of 2 periods. In other words, if the economy is shocked
at time t, workers do not know about this shock until period t+2. Hence, if a worker
has to negotiate her wage at time t for the following 4 periods and there is a positive
productivity shock at time t, she will not demand a higher wage for the following 4
periods because she doesn’t know about the productivity shock yet. At time t+ 2,
workers will know about the productivity shock and would like to demand higher
wages, but they cannot because their wages are fixed for at least another 2 periods.
Given that firms have perfect information, they anticipate that they will keep a
larger fraction of the match surplus for the following 4 periods, which will in turn
create more incentive to post vacancies.
Figure 1.9 illustrates this point in the case of a positive productivity shock
of 1%. The left panel illustrates the evolution of the true productivity (solid black
line) and the perceived productivity by workers at each point in time (dashed line),
which is derived from the Kalman Filter. Hence, if wages for job stayers are flexible,
continuing workers will negotiate wages each period based on their perceived pro-
ductivity level. Hence, we can define the difference between the solid and dashed
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lines (gray area) as the information rent that firms capture. This is because firms
are producing according to a productivity that is equal to the solid line but are
paying labor as if productivity was equal to the dashed line.
Figure 1.9: Flexible versus Sticky Wages for Job Stayers
Note: This figure illustrates the amplifying effects of sticky wages for job stayers.
The left panel plots a situation in which job stayers negotiate their wages every
period. The right panel plots the situation of an unemployed worker who finds a job
4 quarters after a TFP shock, when job stayers negotiate their wages every 4 periods
and new hires negotiate their wages when they are matched with a firm.
Now, suppose that workers negotiate their wages every 4 periods and new hires
negotiate their wages when they are matched with a firm. In this case, workers must
form expectations about future economic conditions based on their beliefs about
the current state of the economy. The right panel of Figure 1.9 illustrates the case
of an unemployed worker who finds a job 4 periods after the productivity shock.
The red dashed line is workers’ perceived productivity at each point in time. For
example, in period 4, when the unemployed worker finds a job, she thinks that the
true productivity is equal to 0.3. Given that she has to negotiate her wage for the
69
following 4 periods, she forecasts future economic conditions based on her beliefs.
Hence, she negotiates wages as if productivity was evolving as in the black dashed
line in the right panel of Figure 1.9. For example, as of period 4, the worker forecasts
a productivity equal to 0.22 in period 8 and negotiates wages accordingly. When
period 8 actually arrives, the worker has received new information and perceives
that aggregate TFP is equal to 0.4, but she cannot renegotiate her wage. Hence,
the information rent for firms increases, giving firms more incentives to expand
employment. Figure A.1 in Appendix A.1 plots the IRFs of this model when wages
for new hires are flexible but are negotiated only once annually (every 4 quarters)
thereafter.44 Even though the difference with respect to my baseline model is small,
the difference is not insignificant. In particular, the model with sticky wages for job
stayers captures very well the dynamics of unemployment for the first 10 quarters
and has a larger vacancy response.
However, this model is not able to generate a significant difference between
the wage semi-elasticity for job stayers and new hires. As shown in Table 1.8,
even if wages are re-negotiated once a year, the wage semi-elasticity for job stayers
generated by this model is about -3% in comparison with -1% reported by Pissarides
(2009). This is because every period there is a fraction of job stayers re-negotiating
their wages according to the economic conditions prevailing in that quarter that
makes the overall average be cyclical.
44This implies that, in each period, a fraction of continuing workers and all new hires will be
negotiating their wages for the following 4 quarters.
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Table 1.8: Wage Semi-Elasticities With Respect To Unemployment Rate. Model
Sticky Wages for Job Stayers
Job Stayers New Hires Job Changers New Workers
-2.91 -3.04 -3.07 -2.91
Notes: This table presents the wage semi-elasticities with respect to the unemployment
rate generated by a model in with sticky wages for job-stayers. Wages are adjusted for
composition effects following the methodology of Horrace and Oaxaga (2001).
1.5.2 Firms Face Information Frictions
Assuming that firms as well as workers face information frictions reinforces my
results. Suppose assume that firms observe their overall productivity (aj + a) at all
times but cannot decompose unexpected changes into aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks. Hence, if firms and workers form expectations about aggregate conditions
based on the signal â, firms will partially attribute aggregate shocks to idiosyncratic
conditions. Therefore, in response to aggregate innovations, firms will underestimate
the increase in quits and future wage changes that will result from a positive TFP
shock. This increases firms’ incentive to post more vacancies, as their perceived
value of an additional worker is greater than is the actual value.
Figure A.2 in Appendix A.1 plots the impulse response functions generated by
this model when I allow the information friction to affect firms as well as workers,
holding other the model parameters at their benchmark values. As expected, in-
troducing information frictions on the firms side reinforces my results, as the IRFs
for labor market quantities are larger than in the benchmark model. Figure A.3 in
71
Appendix A.1 plots the IRFs when I re-calibrate the model parameters, and Table
A.2 in Appendix A.1 presents the simulated business cycle moments. In this new
set-up, the main results do not change relative to benchmark results. The unem-
ployment response to productivity shocks is large and wage responses are delayed.
However, the responses tend to peak earlier than predicted by my empirical esti-
mates. In terms of business cycle moments, the model in which both firms and
workers face information frictions does a good job in terms of standard deviations
and correlations. However, the autocorrelation of the labor market quantities be-
come smaller. This is because, on impact, firms overreact to aggregate shocks, and
they compensate for this in later periods when they have amassed more information.
For example, in response to a positive TFP shock, firms post a lot of vacancies on
impact, but they reduce the number of vacancies (post less) as they learn about ag-
gregate conditions and realize that the value of an additional worker is not as high
as they had thought. This does not happen when firms have perfect information,
as they perfectly predict the value of an additional worker and the convexity of the
hiring cost function induces firms to smooth the number of vacancies they post.
1.5.3 HP Filter
For my benchmark empirical results, I detrend the data using the HP filter
with a smoothing parameter equal to 105. However, it is common in macroeco-
nomics to use a smoothing parameter equal to 1,600 for quarterly data. Figure A.4
in Appendix A.1 plots the IRFs of my model along with those estimated using a
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smoothing parameter equal to 1,600. Responses for labor market quantities, output
and investment are not substantially different from those reported in Figure 1.2.
However, the wage responses are less cyclical in the sense that the maximum re-
sponses are smaller and less significant, indicating that wage responses to transitory
TFP shocks are weak. Why do the wage responses change with the smoothing pa-
rameter? On the one hand, we expect wages and productivity to be correlated in the
long run. If there is a permanent increase in TFP, we should expect higher wages in
the economy. However, whether and how wages adjust to purely transitory shocks
is not clear. Hence, the smaller the smoothing parameter we use, the smaller the
fluctuations that can be explained by transitory shocks since larger fluctuations are
attributed to a long run trend. However, it is worth noting that less cyclical wages
in the data favor wage stickiness as a driving force of the business cycle. Therefore,
my baseline smoothing parameter is conservative in the sense that it reduces the
evidence for wage stickiness.
1.6 Conclusion
I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based on workers’ noisy in-
formation about the state of the economy. In my model, workers receive noisy
signals about the current state of the economy and learn slowly about aggregate
conditions. Hence, wages do not immediately respond to a positive aggregate shock
because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages.
This delayed adjustment in wages increases firms’ incentives to post more vacan-
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cies, making unemployment more volatile and sensitive to aggregate shocks. My
calibrated model is able to explain 60% of the overall unemployment volatility and
displays unemployment and wage dynamics consistent with the data. I find that
the unemployment response to TFP shocks is large and hump-shaped, peaking after
one year. In contrast, wage responses are delayed and weak, peaking instead after
two years.
My model is robust to two major critiques of existing theories of sluggish wages
and volatile unemployment: the flexibility of wages for new hires and the cyclical-
ity of the opportunity cost of employment. On the one hand, my model assumes
flexible wages for new hires and generates a wage semi-elasticity with respect to the
unemployment rate for new hires equal to -3%, which is similar to the estimate of
Pissarides (2009) and larger than the estimates of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013)
and Gertler et al (2014). On the other hand, my model predicts a very pro-cyclical
opportunity cost of employment, as the value of non-working activities in terms of
consumption increases in expansions.
Consistent with recent empirical evidence (e.g. Kahn & McEntarfer, 2014;
Haltiwanger et al., 2015), my model predicts that high-wage highly productive firms
expand employment more than low-wage firms and also exhibit larger wage adjust-
ments in expansions. This implies that the distribution of new hires shifts to the
most productive and high paying firms in response to positive productivity shocks.
This has important consequences for new hires, as they find more and better paying
jobs in expansions.
In this chapter, I examine the data for the United States and estimate the
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fraction of business cycle moments that can be attributed to productivity shocks. In
order to allow for differences in the cyclicality of wages for job stayers and new hires,
I use the Current Population Survey to construct average wages for these groups
of workers controlling for composition effects. According to my results, between 70
and 75% of the overall volatility in labor market quantities such as unemployment
and vacancies can be attributed to transitory TFP innovations. In contrast, only
25% of the overall volatility in wages can be explained by transitory productivity
innovations. I find significant and hump-shaped Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
in the data to productivity shocks for unemployment, vacancies and the vacancy-
unemployment ratio. These responses peak 4 quarters after the shock, and imply
that a 1% TFP shock reduces unemployment by 6%, increases vacancies by 7% and
increases the vacancy-unemployment ratio by 15%. By contrast, the empirical IRFs
for wages are weak and delayed. A 1% TFP shock increases wages by 1% after 8
quarters. My model is able to reproduce the dynamics that I estimate in the data
and is able to explain 90% of the unemployment and vacancy volatility that is due
to transitory productivity shocks.
In the robustness section, I show that assuming sticky wages for job stay-
ers increases the unemployment response to productivity shocks. This result is in
sharp contrast to existing studies, in which wage stickiness for incumbent workers
is irrelevant for hiring decisions as long as wages for new hires are flexible. In my
model, if a new hire has to negotiate her wage for the subsequent n periods, she
gives up using the new information that she otherwise would be using in the future,
which will reduce the gap between the wage she actually demands and the wage she
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should be demanding. Therefore, if wages for new hires do not initially adjust to an
aggregate shock (because of the information friction), sticky wages for job stayers
increase the time it will take for a worker’s wage to adjust, which further increases
firms’ incentive to increase employment in expansions.
However, the wage semi-elasticity generated by this model for job stayers is
significantly higher than reported by Pissarides (2009), which is also the case when
job stayers negotiate their wages once a year. This is because every period there
is a fraction of job stayers re-negotiating their wages according to the economic
conditions prevailing in that quarter that makes the overall average be cyclical.
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Chapter 2: Information Frictions, Nominal Shocks, and the Role of
Inventories in Price-Setting Decisions
2.1 Introduction
In the past decade, much progress has been made on models studying the
impact of information frictions on aggregate supply. Models with sticky information,
rational inattention, or dispersed information display output and inflation dynamics
that are consistent with the empirical evidence: inflation exhibits inertia, responses
to monetary shocks are delayed and persistent, and anticipated disinflations do not
result in booms (Ball, Mankiw & Reis, 2005; Klenow & Willis, 2007; Mankiew &
Reis 2002, 2010; Nimark, 2008; Woodford, 2002).
However, an implicit assumption in the existing literature is that pricing man-
agers do not interact with production managers within firms. Pricing managers set
firms’ prices with limited or noisy information regarding not only aggregate vari-
ables but also their own input prices and demand, while production managers hire
all the labor and capital that is necessary to produce the quantity demanded at
given prices. As stated by Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2012), if this assumption
were relaxed, nominal shocks would not have real effects on the economy because
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the firm’s input prices and demand contain all the information that is needed to
infer the firm’s best responses to nominal shocks in the standard framework used in
existing literature. Hence, it remains unclear why nominal shocks would have real
effects when prices are flexible and there is perfect communication within firms.
This chapter contributes to the literature by presenting a model with perfect
communication within firms, flexible prices, output inventories, and real information
frictions in which nominal shocks have real effects.1 This model is close in spirit
to the islands model of Lucas (1972) and incorporates features from the inventory
model of Khan and Thomas (2007). Intermediate producers observe aggregate vari-
ables with a lag but receive information on their nominal input prices and demand in
real time. Intermediate goods firms face idiosyncratic shocks, and as a consequence
cannot perfectly infer the aggregate state of the economy. Intermediate producers
set their output prices, determine production, and make inventories decisions based
on their information set.
In this model, inventories are the link between information frictions, perfect
communication within firms, and non-neutrality of nominal shocks. This is because
inventories help smooth cost shocks and thus affect pricing and production decisions.
The idea that inventories smooth cost shocks has been extensively explored in the
literature (Bils & Kahn, 2000; Khan & Thomas, 2007; Ramsey & West, 1999).
1Following the terminology of Angeletos and La’O (2012), if firms make certain production
decisions based on noisy information (or limited attention), the information friction is considered
real. In standard information friction models, firms set their nominal prices based on noisy or
limited information, but real variables adjust freely to the true state of the nature, as if they
were made under perfect information (Angeletos & La’0, 2012, p 2). In the model of this chapter,
production and inventory decisions are taken based on noisy information about aggregate variables,
which makes the information friction real.
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In almost every model with inventories, firms accumulate inventories in response
to favorable marginal cost shocks. The resulting increase in production increases
current marginal cost, smoothing marginal cost through time. In this model, I show
that this cost smoothing also implies that firms’ prices are smoothed through time
under monopolistic competition.
The cost-smoothing role of inventories helps to explain the non-neutrality of
nominal shocks for the following reason: given that firms only observe their nominal
input prices and demand, they will accumulate inventories (by producing more) as
long as they think that they are facing temporarily low real input prices. After a
contractionary nominal shock, firms observe lower nominal input prices. They do
not know the source of this change, but they know that it could be due to a either
positive productivity innovation or a nominal shock. Since productivity shocks
have a positive probability, firms will increase their stock of inventories. This will
prevent firms’ current prices from decreasing as much as they would in a model
without inventories, which will distort relative prices, and make current profits and
household income go down. As a consequence, aggregate demand falls.
I study a quantitative version of my model and find that a one-percent decrease
in the money growth rate causes output to decline 0.17% in the first quarter and
0.38% in the second quarter, followed by a slow recovery to the steady state. I also
find that contractionary nominal shocks have significant effects on total investment,
which remains 1% below the steady state for the first 6 quarters. The investment
response to an aggregate nominal perturbation is -0.67% in the first quarter and
reaches its trough response of -2.26% in the second quarter.
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I compare the model with information frictions to a model with perfect and
complete information, and I find that information frictions make the model more
consistent with the empirical evidence. In a model with complete and perfect infor-
mation, inventory investment is pro-cyclical, and the standard deviation of inventory
investment is small. In contrast, in the model with information frictions, inventory
investment is counter-cyclical, and its standard deviation is closer to the data. Also,
given the role of inventories, prices are more stable in absolute terms and relative
to output in the model with information frictions.
This chapter also contributes to the literature by illustrating the general point
that if firms make dynamic decisions (such as capital accumulation or inventory
investment) and if their nominal input prices and demand do not perfectly reveal
the state of nature, the economy exhibits money non-neutrality even under flexible
prices and perfect communication within firms (Proposition 3). This non-neutrality
occurs because firms need to forecast future aggregate conditions in order to make
dynamic decisions. Hence, when current input prices and demand do not perfectly
reveal aggregate conditions, firms make forecast errors because their inference about
the state of the nature is wrong, and their real decisions deviate from the decision
that would have been taken under perfect information. Thus, investment is key
for money non-neutrality. Similarly, these results point out that firms input prices
and demand contain noisy but important information about aggregate conditions,
implying that how firms process information is key for understanding real responses
to monetary shocks. The existing literature abstracts from this issue.
I solve the model by combining the Kalman-Filter with the solution method
80
for heterogenous agent models proposed by Reiter (2009). The idea behind my
solution method is to guess a linear law of motion for the aggregate variables and to
find the steady state of the economy using the Kalman Filter. Then, the economy
is linearized around this steady state following the methodology of Reiter (2009),
which generates a new law of motion for the economy. The law of motion is updated
until a fixed point is reached.
This chapter is related to the literature on information frictions and aggregate
supply. In this chapter, nominal shocks have real effects mainly because firms have
imperfect information, not because prices are sticky. As argued by Ball, Mankiw
and Reis (2005), models with information frictions may be able to improve upon
the implausible inflation-output dynamics of the new Keynesian models. Mankiw
and Reis (2002) assume that pricing managers update their information set every
period with an exogenous probability and show that nominal disturbances can pro-
duce persistent real responses. Klenow and Willis (2007) assume that firms receive
information regarding macro state variables every AT periods in a staggered fashion
and find that greater values for AT lead to a delayed, hump shaped response of infla-
tion and a stronger output response to nominal shocks. The assumption that agents
receive information about macro state variables with a lag has microfundation in
the papers of Reis (2006) and Acharya (2012). Reis (2006) shows that producers
optimally do not process current news about aggregate variables when firms have
to pay a cost of acquiring new information. Similarly, Acharya (2012) shows that
firms optimally update their information about idiosyncratic shocks more often than
their information about aggregate shocks when the cost of updating both types of
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information is the same but the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic disturbances
is greater. Unlike this chapter, these articles implicitly assume imperfect communi-
cation within firms. Namely, pricing managers do not observe the firm’s input prices
and demand at all times, but production managers do observe this information and
use it to make optimal production decisions.
A key assumption of the model presented in this chapter is that firms face a
signal extraction problem. Firms need to form expectations about aggregate condi-
tions based on perfectly observed input prices and demand, which contain important
but noisy information about the state of the nature. This assumption follows Lucas
(1972), who assumes that producers face real idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate
nominal shocks, and need to form beliefs about the idiosyncratic and aggregate
part of their demand in order to make production decisions. Hence, nominal in-
novations have real effects on the economy because firms make forecast errors by
misinterpreting price changes. A signal extraction problem also appears in Nimark
(2008), who studies a model with sticky prices and information frictions. Nimark as-
sumes that firms face Calvo-type nominal regidities and observe their idiosyncratic
marginal cost, but do not have perfect information regarding the economy-wide
average marginal cost, which is needed in order to set firms’ prices optimally. Ni-
mark shows that these assumptions help explain a gradual and persistent inflation
response to nominal shocks. Similarly, recent literature on dispersed information
assumes that producers face a signal extraction problem. For example, Woodford
(2001) and Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) assume that pricing managers observe
some aggregate variables such as productivity and markups with noise. In contrast
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to these articles, this chapter assumes that the person making the pricing decision
perfectly observes everything that happens inside the firm, including input prices,
input quantities and quantity sold at given prices.
This chapter also builds on the work of Angeletos and La’O (2012), who make
a clear distinction between real and nominal information frictions. According to
their terminology, an information friction is considered real if it affects the firm’s
decision of a real variable. For example, Angeletos and La’O assume that firms
make capital decisions based on the same limited or noisy information used to set
prices. In this chapter, the information friction is real because it affects inventory
decisions.
This work is also part of a recent literature studying monetary models with
inventories. Jung and Yun (2013) show that the relationship between current infla-
tion and the marginal cost of production weakens in a model with inventories and
Calvo-type nominal rigidities. Krytsov and Midrigan (2013) point out that coun-
tercyclical markups produced by inventories, rather than nominal rigidities, can
account for much of the real effects of monetary policy. Even though I do not study
markups per se in this chapter, I also find that the relationship between prices and
the marginal cost of production breaks down when firms can accumulate invento-
ries. When a firm’s cost increases drastically, the firm reduces production and sells a
fraction of its inventory holdings. This reduction in the stock of inventories prevents
the firm’s price from rising as much as it would in a model without inventories. In
contrast to previous work, inventories in my model are crucial to explaining why
there are real responses to monetary shocks. This is not true in Jung and Yun
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(2013) and Krytsov and Midrigan (2013), which both assume some type of nominal
price rigidity, so that monetary policy is effective even without inventories.
Finally, this work is related to previous studies exploring the implications of the
cost smoothing motive of inventory investment (e.g Bils & Kahn, 2000; Eichenbaum,
1989; Khan & Thomas, 2007a, 2007b). In contrast to the existing literature, my work
studies the role of inventories in pricing decisions in a setting with monopolistically
competitive firms. This will be relevant to understanding what makes prices more
or less responsive to monetary shocks.
This chapter is divided into five sections. In section two, I present the model
setup and discuss some properties of the decision rules. In section three, I solve the
model when all agents have perfect information. In section four, I solve the model
under a particular information friction. Section five concludes.
2.2 Model
The model is close in spirit to Lucas (1972) and incorporates features from
the inventory model of Khan and Thomas (2007). There are three agents in this
economy: a representative household, a representative final good producer, and a
continuum of intermediate goods firms. Households supply labor and capital to
the intermediate goods firms, and they purchase a final good that can be used for
consumption and investment. The final good producer aggregates the intermediate
goods of the economy through a constant returns to scale production function,
sells its output in a competitive market to the household, and cannot accumulate
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inventories. Intermediate goods producers sell their product in a monopolistically
competitive market to the representative final good firm and can accumulate output
inventories.
Households derive utility from consumption and leisure and discount future
utility by β. Households supply labor and capital to the intermediate goods produc-
ers in perfectly competitive and sector specific markets, and they own all interme-
diate and final goods firms. Capital depreciates at rate δK and can be augmented
by using the final good as investment: Kt = (1− δK)Kt−1 +Xt.
I assume a continuum of differentiated industries with measure one and in-
dexed by j. Each industry is represented by an intermediate goods firm that pro-
duces with capital, k, and labor, h, through a concave production function. Each
intermediate goods firm can accumulate output inventories, and its output is de-
noted by y = (kαh1−α)
γ
, where γ < 1. I provide an explicit motive for inventory
accumulation by assuming that intermediate goods firms face idiosyncratic shocks
to their demand and input prices. At the beginning of each period, an intermedi-
ate good firm is identified by its inventory holdings, I, its current demand, d, and
its current input prices, q. An intermediate goods firm sets its output price and
determines current production, which is devoted to sales and inventory investment.
I assume that intermediate goods firms always observe their nominal input
prices and demand but do not observe current aggregate variables. Firms observe
the nominal wage and rental rate of capital of their sector. As a consequence, firms
know how much it costs to produce y units and how many units of their product
they can sell at price p for any y, p > 0.
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Finally, I follow the literature and assume a cash-in-advance constraint for
the nominal output: PtYt = Mt, where Yt denotes total aggregate production. The
productivity of the final good firm (aggregate total factor productivity), A, and
money balances, M , follow AR(1) processes in logs, and these are the only sources
of aggregate uncertainty in the model.
2.2.1 Household’s Problem
The representative household owns all the economy’s firms, and supplies labor
and capital to the intermediate goods producers in competitive and sector-specific
markets. Each period, the household allocates its total income between money hold-
ings, consumption and investment, in order to maximize its expected discounted life-
time utility. The monetary authority is assumed to pay interest on money holdings






























Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt +Xt (2.4)
Where Ct is consumption, Mt is money balances, Xt represents fixed capital
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investment, Kt is the stock of capital at the beginning of period t, it is the nominal
interest rate, and ΠF stands for aggregate nominal dividends from the economy’s
firms. hjt is the labor supply to sector j, and Wjt is the nominal wage in that sector.
φw,jt is a sector-specific preference shock that is i.i.d. across sectors and independent
of all other shocks. log(φw,jt) is distributed normal with zero mean and variance
σ2w. Rjt is the nominal rental rate of capital in sector j at time t, and kjt is the
supply of capital to that sector at time t. I assume that at the beginning of each
period, each unit of “general” capital can be “transformed” into 1
φr,jt
units of type-j
capital.2 φr,jt is a sector-specific shock that is i.i.d. across sectors and independent
of other shocks, and log(φr,jt) is distributed normal with zero mean and variance
σ2r .


















Wjt = φw,jtWt (2.7)
Rjt = φr,jtRt (2.8)
2For instance, one can think of computers as being the capital good. Every sector needs
computers in order to produce, but each sector needs some specific programs that must be installed
or updated before they can be used in the production process.
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Where Wt and Rt are the aggregate nominal wage and rental rate of capital.
3
















Mt+1 + PtCt + PtXt ≤ WtHt +RtKt + ΠFt + itMt (2.10)

























2.2.2 Final Good Firm Problem
There is a representative final good firm that sells its product, St, to the
household in a competitive market. This firm produces using the intermediate goods
of the economy through a constant returns production function. Hence, the problem
3In other words, the nominal wage and rental rate of capital in a sector with no idiosyncratic
shocks (φw,jt = φr,jt = 1)
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Where πft stands for nominal profits, At is aggregate total factor productivity,
sjt is the amount of the intermediate good j used in the production of the final
good, and χjt is a good-specific technology shock that is i.i.d. across sectors and
independent of all other shocks. log(χj) is distributed normal with zero mean and

















given. Throughout this chapter, I define djt as firm j ’s nominal demand in period




I assume that intermediate goods firms always observe djt, which means that
they know how many units of their output they can sell at different prices. In-
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termediate goods firms know that their nominal demand depends on aggregate
(St, Pt, At) and idiosyncratic (χjt) variables, but they cannot infer these compo-
nents separately by observing djt. In equilibrium the profits of the final good firm












Finally, I assume that total aggregate factor productivity, At, follows an AR(1)
process in logs:
log(At) = ρAlog(At−1) + εA,t (2.20)
εA,t ∼ N(0, σ2A) (2.21)
2.2.3 Intermediate Goods Firms Problem
In each industry j, there is a single intermediate producer that supplies its
product in a monopolistically competitive market to the final good firm. Each
intermediate producer chooses employment, capital, the price of its product, and
the stock of inventories for the next period. The cost of borrowing one unit of type-j
capital in period t is given by the nominal rental rate Rjt, and the nominal wage of
type-j labor is given by Wjt. Hence the problem for the intermediate good firm in
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sector j is given by:



















Ijt+1 ≥ 0 (2.27)
πjt is the current nominal profit, pjt is the price of good j, and Q0,t is the




(2.24) is the firm’s demand, which was defined in equations (2.17) and (2.18). Now,
by cost minimization, we can re-write this problem as follows:














yjt = sjt + Ijt+1 − Ijt (2.31)










is the nominal price of the firm’s inputs. Notice
that qjt can be decomposed as follows:















Where q̄t is the “aggregate” nominal input price, and ϕjt is an idiosyncratic
shock that is i.i.d. across sectors and is distributed log-normal with zero mean and
variance σ2ϕ ≡ ασ2r + (1 − α)σ2w. The above problem is strictly concave, and the
































Equation (2.36) states that the firm’s price is equal to a markup times the
marginal cost of production regardless of the production allocation. On the other
hand, according to equation (2.37), inventories are used to smooth the marginal
4 Notice that the firm’s problem can be written as follows:
















Since ε > 1 and γ ≤ 1, the first term in the firm’s objective is strictly concave, and the second
term is convex. Hence, this problem is strictly concave.
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cost of production through time, and this equation holds with equality if Ijt+1 > 0.
Suppose, for example, that a firm expects its marginal cost to go up in future
periods due to an increase in the price of its inputs, qj. In anticipation, the firm
should increase its production and inventory stock in the current period, in order
to sell those additional units when qj goes up. This would make the current and
future marginal cost move in opposite directions, smoothing the firm’s marginal
cost. We have a similar story when a firm expects its demand, dj, to increase. For
the purposes of this work, the following lemmas will be useful.
Lemma 5. pjt is strictly decreasing in Ijt
Proof. See appendix B.1.1
In order to understand Lemma 5, suppose that the stock of inventories of a
firm increases unexpectedly. Therefore, given that the firm will eventually sell those
additional units, the firm’s price will have to decrease at some point in order to
induce consumers to buy more.
Lemma 6. Assuming that ε > 1 and that γ ≤ 1, the optimal decision rules for pjt
and Ijt+1 have the following properties:
• The current optimal price (p∗jt) is strictly increasing in the firm’s current de-
mand (djt) and input prices (qjt).
• The current optimal price (p∗jt) is weakly increasing in the firm’s future demand
(djt+1) and input prices qjt+1.
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• The optimal next period’s stock of inventories (I∗jt+1) is weakly decreasing in
the firm’s current demand (djt) and input prices qjt. Moreover, if the initial
stock of inventories is positive (Ijt > 0), I
∗
jt+1 is strictly decreasing in djt and
qjt.
• The optimal next period’s stock of inventories (I∗jt+1) is weakly increasing in
the firm’s future demand (djt+1) and input prices (qjt+1).
Proof. See appendix B.1.2.
Intuitively, given that inventories are used to smooth cost shocks, a firm will
sell inventories when its demand or input price increase. This will lower current
marginal cost below what it would otherwise be in the absence of inventories. Sim-
ilarly, if a firm expects its demand or input price to go up in the future, it will
accumulate inventories by increasing its current production. This will make the
current marginal cost, and thus the firm’s current output price, increase relative to
what it would otherwise be in the absence of inventories.
Lemma 7. At the firm level, inventories impose an upper bound on the expected








Proof. See appendix B.1.3
This lemma implies that, with monopolistic competition, inventories smooth
not only the marginal cost of production but also firms’ prices. Intuitively, sup-
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pose that a firm expects its price to go up in the following period and that pt <






> 1. Notice that this firm could increase its
profits by producing more today and selling those extra units in the next period. On
the one hand, the increase in current production would make the current marginal
cost go up, increasing pt. On the other hand, according to lemma 5, the increase
in the stock of next period’s inventories will make pt+1 decrease. As a consequence,
the firm will accumulate inventories up to the point where pt = E [Qt,t+1 · pt+1]. In
that situation, the marginal benefit of selling one extra unit today (pt) will be equal
to the marginal benefit of selling one extra unit in the next period (E[Qt,t+1 · pt+1]).
2.2.4 Money And Nominal Shocks
I sidestep the micro-foundations of money and impose a cash-in-advance con-
straint on nominal output:
PtYt = Me
µt (2.39)
µt = ρµµt−1 + εµ,t (2.40)
εµ,t ∼ N(0, σ2µ) (2.41)
This assumption is standard in the literature. For example, Angeletos and
La’O (2012) impose a similar restriction on total aggregate expenditure. Given
these assumptions, inflation is zero in the deterministic steady state, in which εµ,t =
εA,t = 0.
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2.3 Solving the Model With Perfect Information
In this section, I solve this model assuming perfect information. As I will show,
nominal shocks do not have real effects on this economy. However, the optimal de-
cision rules depicted in this subsection will help to explain why nominal shocks have
real effects when a particular information friction is introduced. I start by defin-
ing the competitive equilibrium of this economy and establishing that this economy
exhibits the classical dichotomy. Next, I report the impulse response functions to
a productivity shock and compare them with those generated by two alternative
models: (i) one in which there is no heterogeneity across sectors and firms cannot
accumulate inventories, and (ii) one model in which there is heterogeneity across
firms but firms cannot accumulate inventories.
2.3.1 Competitive Equilibrium with Perfect and Complete Informa-
tion
Definition: A competitive equilibrium with perfect and complete information
in this economy is a sequence of prices
{





Yt, Xt, Ht, yjt, hjt, kjt
}
, a distribution of intermediate goods firms {λ(I, q, d)t}, and
exogenous variables {µt, At}, such that given the initial conditions K0, λ(I, q, d)0:
1. Households optimize taking prices, exogenous variables, the distribution of in-





satisfies equations (2.12), (2.13), (2.14), (2.10), and (2.11) along
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with the transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞
βtu′(Ct)Kt = 0. (2.42)
lim
t→∞
βtu′(Ct)Mt = 0. (2.43)
2. The final good producer optimize taking prices, exogenous variables, the distri-

























3. Intermediate goods producers optimize taking
{
Pt,Wt, Rt, it, qjt, {pzt}z 6=j
}
, ex-
ogenous variables, the distribution of intermediate goods firms, and initial con-
ditions as given. The sequence {yjt, Ijt+1, pjt} satisfies equations (2.36), (2.37),
(2.25), and (2.26) along with the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
βtu′(Ct)It = 0. (2.46)
4. The distribution of intermediate goods firms evolves according to
λ(I ′, q′, d′)t+1 =
∫
1{I(I,q,d)=I′} · pr(q′ ∧ d′|q, d) · dλ(I, q, d)t (2.47)
Where 1{I(I,q,d)=I′} is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if a firm with
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initial stock of inventories I, input price q, and demand d, chooses a stock of










Yt = Ct +Xt + It+1 − It (2.50)
6. The money growth rate and log total factor productivity follow AR(1) pro-
cesses:
µt = ρµµt−1 + εµ,t (2.51)
log(At) = ρAlog(At−1) + εA,t (2.52)
Proposition 1. The set of real allocations
{
Ct, Kt, It, Yt, Xt, Ht, yjt, hjt, kjt
}
and distribution of intermediate goods firms {λ(I, q, d)t} that are consistent with the
existence of a competitive equilibrium is independent of the path for money.
Proof. See appendix B.1.4
Hence, this economy exhibits the classical dichotomy. As long as prices are
flexible and all agents in this economy have perfect and complete information, real
and nominal variables can be analyzed separately.
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2.3.2 Numerical Analysis
I now examine impulse responses for a parameterized version of the model.
The time period is one quarter. I draw on existing literature for the values of σ, η,
δ, and ε. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ) is set to 2. The inverse of
the Frisch elasticity (η) is equal to 0.4. The rate of capital depreciation δ is fixed to
0.017, and the elasticity of substitution (ε) is set to 5.
β is selected so that the model has a real interest rate of 6.5% per year in steady
state. The preference parameter Ψ is calibrated to set the average hours worked in
steady state to one-third of available time. The parameter associated with the
capital share (α) is chosen so that the annual capital-output ratio in steady state is
equal to 2.2, a value consistent with US data from 1960 to 2013.
In order to calibrate the persistence and standard deviation of the productivity
shock (ρA and σA), I use the series for Total Factor Productivity from the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco for the period between 1960 and 2013. Detrending
these series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and estimating an AR(1) process to
the detrended series yields a value of 0.8 for ρA and 0.013 for σA.
I use the sweep-adjusted M1S series to calibrate the parameters associated
with the money growth rate. Detrending the log series using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter and estimating an AR(1) to this data yields a value of 0.9 for ρµ and 0.0084
for σµ.
Finally, I assume that the standard deviations of the idiosyncratic shocks are
equal so firms’ demand and input prices are equally informative about aggregate
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conditions. This standard deviation is calibrated so that the stock of inventories
represents 13% of total GDP in the model with no information frictions. This is
consistent with the inventories-output ratio for finished manufactured goods for the
U.S. This implies a standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks equal to 9%.
2.3.3 Model Dynamics with Perfect Information
Given this set of parameters, I find the deterministic steady state and report it
in table 2.1.5 Figure 2.1 displays the intermediate firms’ decision rules for different
levels of the nominal demand dj and input prices qj, and the first panel of Figure 2.2
shows the ergodic distribution of inventories for this model. As stated in Lemmas 5
and 6, the price decision rule is strictly decreasing in the initial stock of inventories.
Also, notice that firms accumulate inventories when they face low input prices or
demand because in those situations the marginal cost of production is low. Another
feature of this figure is that the higher the initial stock of inventories, the smaller the
impact of a cost or demand shock on the firm’s price. For instance, when a firm’s
input price increases, the impact on the firm’s price can be smoothed as long as the
firm has a positive initial stock of inventories. According to the ergodic distribution,
45% of firms do not have inventories at a typical point in time, and 95% have an
initial stock of inventories between zero and 0.5.
5In the deterministic steady state σA = σµ = 0
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Figure 2.1: Intermediate Goods Firms’ Decision Rules
Note: This Figure shows the intermediate goods firms decision rules in steady state in a model with perfect and complete information.
q(j)- Nominal input price. d(j)- Nominal demand. p- firm’s output price. y- firm’s production. I- end of period inventories.
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P 0.69 Price index







Note: This table reports the steady state values for the
model variables in the model with perfect and complete
information.
To compute the impulse responses of this model, I take a first order approxi-
mation of the economy around the deterministic steady state, following the method-
ology proposed by Reiter (2009).6 This methodology allows a higher order represen-
tation of the cross-sectional distribution in the state vector and has the advantage
that the solution is fully non-linear in the idiosyncratic (presumably large) shocks
but linear in the aggregate (presumably small) shocks.7
Figure 2.3 plots the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in aggregate
total factor productivity, A. The figure shows that inventories decline initially, then
exhibits a hump shaped increase. These dynamics are the net results of several com-
peting forces. First, the increase in productivity creates an incentive to accumulate
more inventories for intermediate firms that are also facing a positive idiosyncratic
productivity shock. In contrast, intermediate firms that are facing a negative id-
iosyncratic shock know that they will face a better shock with a high probability
6Appendix B.2 discusses in detail how I solved the model.
7For the purposes of this work, this will be particularly useful when computing the firm’s
expectations. Given the linearity of the solution in aggregate variables, firms can use a linear
filter, such as the Kalman Filter, in order to compute their expectations.
102
Figure 2.2: Ergodic Distributions of Inventories
Note: This Figure plots the ergodic distribution of inventories in a model with perfect
and complete information (left panel) and in a model with information frictions (right
panel).
in the next period, and therefore they have an incentive to sell their stock of inven-
tories in the current period. Second, firms expect total demand to keep increasing
for another three quarters, which creates an incentive to accumulate inventories in
the current period. Third, there is a big initial jump in total demand. Hence, firms
have an incentive to use their stock of inventories in the current period in order to
keep their prices relatively constant and take advantage of the increase in aggregate
demand. As a result of these competing effects, most firms decide to sell a fraction
of their inventories initially and wait until next period to accumulate inventories,
making inventory investment countercyclical. However, inventory investment is pro-
cyclical in the data (e.g. Ramey & West, 1999; Bils & Kahn, 2000; Khan & Thomas,
2007). As I will discuss in the next section, one important assumption that drives
the response for inventories is that firms know what is happening in the economy.
Once I modify this assumption, inventory investment will become procyclical.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions to a Productivity Shock. Model with Perfect and Complete Information
Note: This figure plots the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in total aggregate productivity in a model with perfect and
complete information. All figures are deviations with respect to the deterministic steady state. The change in inventories is expressed as
a fraction of output in steady state. Total investment is the sum of fixed capital investment and inventory investment. The intermediate
good price is the average of input prices.
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2.4 Solving the Model with Information Frictions
I now introduce a particular information friction in this economy. I assume
that final goods firms observe aggregate variables with a lag of T periods but receive
information about their input prices and demand in real time. For simplicity, I set T
equal to 1, which implies that firms do not observe the current level of the aggregate
variables. As stated before, one contribution of this chapter is to provide a model
with perfect communication within firms in which nominal shocks have real effects.
The following proposition shows why this is important:
Proposition 2. Suppose that all agents in the economy except firms have perfect and
complete information. Moreover, assume that intermediate goods producers cannot
hold inventories, so their problem becomes:

















yt = st (2.55)
If prices are flexible, and if there is perfect communication within firms such
that pricing managers perfectly observe their input prices and demand, then nominal
shocks do not have real effects on the economy regardless of the information friction
on aggregate variables.
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Proof. See appendix B.1.5.
Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2012) prove a result similar to Proposition 2 for
a simpler model.8 If firms do not accumulate inventories or make other dynamic
decisions such as investment, then as long as firms observe their current demand and
input prices, information frictions are irrelevant. The intuition is simple: in such a
model firms only need to know their current demand and input prices in order to
infer their best response. A firm does not need to know the actual value of C, X, P
or even its own demand shock χ, because d and q contain all the information that
is relevant. This proposition implies, for example, that the models of Mankiw and
Reis (2002), Paciello and Wiederhold (2011), and Klenow and Willis (2007) would
not display real responses to monetary shocks if perfect communication within firms
was allowed. However, Proposition 2 does not hold when intermediate goods firms
can accumulate inventories or capital. This result is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that all agents in the economy except intermediate firms
have perfect and complete information. If intermediate goods firms can accumulate
inventories or capital and their input prices and demand do not reveal the aggregate
state of the economy, the economy exhibits money non-neutrality.
Proof. See appendix B.1.6.
These results are related to Angeletos and La’O (2012), who distinguish be-
tween nominal and real information frictions. Notice that one key difference be-
8This result is formalized in their Proposition 1.
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tween the problem faced by firms in Propositions 2 and 3 is the existence of real
information frictions in the latter setting. Nominal shocks have real effects in the
environment specified in Proposition 3 because investment decisions are based on
noisy information about the state of nature, which makes the information friction
real. In the environment of Angeletos and La’O (2012), however, nominal shocks
would not have real effects if input prices and demand were perfectly observed. This
is because firms could perfectly infer the aggregate state of the economy based on
that information.9
Intuitively, when firms makes investment decision, future aggregate conditions
play an important role in firms’ problem. This is because the stock of inventories
or the stock of capital affect future profits. Hence, when current input prices and
demand do not perfectly reveal current aggregate conditions, firms make forecast
mistakes because their inference about the state of the nature is wrong.
For instance, assume that firms accumulate inventories and that the aggre-
gate input prices go down keeping everything else constant. If firms observe the
aggregate state, they will react by adjusting output prices down, and real variables
will be unchanged. But, if firms only observe aggregate variables with a lag, they
will initially only observe their own input prices going down. Firms do not know
the source of that movement. They only know that it could be because (i) the
9Input prices and demand do not reveal the aggregate state of the economy as long as the
number of variables observed by firms is lower than the number of aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks in the economy (see proof of proposition 3 in appendix B.1.6). In Angeletos and La’O
(2012), firms would observe five variables: their productivity, their demand, the wage rate of their
sector, tax rates, and the aggregate price index (price of investment); and firms will face the same
number of shocks: productivity shocks, consumption preference shocks, labor preferences shocks,
tax shocks, and nominal shocks.
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aggregate economy has experienced a positive productivity shock, (ii) the aggre-
gate economy has experienced a contractionary nominal shock, (iii) the firm has
experienced a positive idiosyncratic shock, or (iv) a combination of these. There-
fore, firms’ responses will be a combination of the optimal responses for each case.
Given that firms want to accumulate inventories when they are shocked by a pos-
itive idiosyncratic shock, they will respond to lower input prices by accumulating
inventories, which has a positive effect on the firm’s current price. How strong their
responses are will depend on their expectations and the probability for each case.
This points out why inventories help to explain the non-neutrality of money when
perfect communication within firms is assumed.
In light of proposition 3, it is worth explaining why this chapter introduces
money non-neutrality by allowing the firm to accumulate inventories and not cap-
ital as the previous proposition also suggests. As this chapter shows, inventories
impose an endogenous upper bound on firms’ expected price increases and make
firms’ prices more persistent, and these features may have important implications
for the transition mechanism of monetary policy that have not been discussed in the
previous literature. However, I do not mean to suggest that inventories are more
relevant than capital accumulation for the monetary authority. That question could
be addressed by future work. The main message of this chapter is that investment
decisions are key for money non-neutrality under noisy information, flexible prices
and perfect communications within firms. Similarly, in the spirit of Lucas (1972),
this work aims to point out that firms’ input prices and demand contain noisy but
important information about aggregate conditions, and how firms process that in-
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formation is also key for understanding real responses to monetary shocks. The
relevant literature, including Angeletos and La’O (2012), abstracts from this signal
extraction problem faced by firms.
2.4.1 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given the information friction that was introduced above, it is convenient to
define the competitive equilibrium in recursive form. Denote ξ as the vector of
aggregate state variables, which will be defined below. The household’s recursive
optimization problem is:







+ βE [U (K,M, ξ′)] (2.56)
s.t.
M ′ + PC + PX ≤ WH +RK + ΠF + iM (2.57)
K ′ = (1− δK)K +X (2.58)
ξ′ = ωh (ξ) (2.59)
Where equation (2.59) is the household’s perceived law of motion of ξ. The so-
lution to this problem is given by decision rulesM ′(K,M, ξ), K ′(K,M, ξ), C(K,M, ξ),
H(K,M, ξ), X(K,M, ξ). Similarly, the intermediate goods firms’ recursive opti-
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mization problem is:
V (I, q, d, ξ−1) = max
p,s,y,I′
π + E{q′,d′,ξ,Q|q,d,ξ−1} [QV (I
′, q′, d′, ξ)] (2.60)
s.t.
π = ps− qy
1
γ (2.61)
s = dp−ε (2.62)
y = s+ I ′ − I (2.63)
I ′ ≥ 0 (2.64)
ξ′ = ωF (ξ) (2.65)
Where equation (2.65) is the firms’ perceived law of motion of ξ. Since firms
observe aggregate variables with a one period lag, the firm’s problem depends on
ξ−1 and not on ξ as in the household’s problem. Hence, the solution in this case is
given by decision rules p(I, q, d, ξ−1), s(I, q, d, ξ−1), y(I, q, d, ξ−1), I(I, q, d, ξ−1).
Given the assumed information friction, the vector of aggregate state variables
will be given by:
ξ = [µ,A,Λ, K, µ−1, A−1]
′ (2.66)
Given that the only two sources of aggregate uncertainty are the productivity
and nominal shocks, agents in this economy can perfectly infer the current distri-
bution of firms (Λ) and stock of capital (K) by observing ξ−1. This is why Λ−1 and
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K−1 are not relevant for the law of motion of the economy.
The household’s decision rule for capital accumulation along with the firms’
decision rules for inventories induce a law of motion for the aggregate variables ω(ξ).
In the recursive rational expectations equilibrium the actual and the perceived law
of motions are equal. To economize on notation, I henceforth let x(·) denote the
decision rule for x.
Definition: A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by pricing functions{
P (ξ), W (ξ), R(ξ), i(ξ), q(ξ)
}
, a law of motion for the aggregate variables ω(ξ),
and a set of decision rules
{





U(K,M, ξ), V (I, q, d, ξ−1)
}
such that:
1. K(·), M(·), C(·), H(·), X(·) and U(K, ξ) solve the household’s recursive op-
timization problem, taking as given P (ξ), W (ξ), R(ξ), i(ξ), and ω(ξ).
2. p(·), s(·), y(·), I(·) and V (I, q, d, ξ−1) solve the intermediate goods firms’ prob-
lem, taking as given q(ξ), P (ξ), W (ξ), i(ξ), and ω(ξ).
































Yt = C(·) +X(·) + I(·)− I (2.71)
5. The perceived law of motion for the aggregate variables is consistent with the
actual law of motion:
ω(ξ) = ωh(ξ) = ωF (ξ) (2.72)
6. The distribution of firms evolves according to
λ(I ′, q′, d′, ξ′) =
∫
1{I(I,q,d,ξ−1)=I′} · pr(q′ ∧ d′|q, d) · dλ(I, q, d, ξ) (2.73)
Where 1{I(I,q,d,ξ−1)=I′} is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if a firm with
initial stock of inventories I, input price q, and demand d, chooses a stock of
inventories for the next period equal to I ′.
2.4.2 Computation with Information Frictions
I solve this problem for small deviations around the steady state by following
the methodology of Reiter (2009). This methodology has the feature that the law
of motion for the aggregate variables is linear. Denoting Y as the vector of jump
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variables, this economy can be described by the following two equations:
ξ̂′ = F ξ̂ + V (2.74)
Ŷ = Gξ̂ (2.75)
Where x̂ denotes the deviation in levels of x around the steady state, F and




is the vector of i.i.d.
shocks. ni is the number of grid points for the stock of inventories and nz is the
number of grid points for the idiosyncratic shocks.
To find the equilibrium of this economy, I start with a guess for matrices F
and G. Given this guess, the household’s and firms’ decision rules induce a law of
motion and two new matrices F (new) and G(new). In equilibrium, these matrices have
to be equal. If they are not, I update these matrices until a fixed point is reached.
One should note that the intermediate goods firms face a signal extraction
problem. They observe their current input price (q) and demand (d) but do not
have information about the current aggregate variables. These firms need to form
expectations about the evolution of their input prices and demand in order to make
their pricing and inventory decisions. To see this notice that:
d = χD (2.76)
q = ϕq̄ (2.77)








is the aggregate nominal input price. Since the law of motion for
the aggregate variables is linear, I use the Kalman Filter to compute the expecta-
tions of the intermediate goods firms. Taking logs in equations (2.76) and (2.77) we
get:
log(d) = log(Dss) +DssD̂ + log(χ) (2.78)
log(q) = log(q̄ss) + q̄sŝ̄q + log(ϕ) (2.79)
Where xss denotes the value of x in steady state. Notice that firms observe
log(d) and log(q), but they do not observe D̂, ̂̄q, χ, ϕ. Therefore, this signal extrac-













ξ̂′ = F ξ̂ + V (2.81)
Where GD and Gq̄ are the rows of matrix G associated with the jump variables
D and q̄. Hence, this system can be solved using the Kalman Filter.
2.4.3 Impulse responses with Information Frictions
Assuming the same parameter values as for the perfect information model, I
report the steady state for this economy in Table 2.2 and the ergodic distribution of
inventories in the second panel of Figure 2.2. The only significant difference between
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the steady state with perfect information and the steady state with information
frictions is that the stock of inventories now represents 15% of total output. Given
that aggregate uncertainty is greater with information frictions and given that the
final goods firms value function (V (I, q, d, ξ−1)) is strictly concave, intermediate
firms have more incentive to invest in inventories, which provide insurance against
negative shocks from the point of view of the firm.10






P 0.69 Price index







Note: This table reports the steady state values for the
endogenous model variables in the model in which fi-
nal goods firms do not have information about current
aggregate variables.
2.4.3.1 Productivity shock
Figure 2.4 plots the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in productiv-
ity, and Figure 2.5 compares these impulse responses with those generated by the
model with perfect information. One of the most striking results is that inventories
increase after the productivity shock in the model with information frictions. To
explain this result, suppose for simplicity that the idiosyncratic cost ϕ has a uni-
10Using language from consumer theory, firms have a precautionary motive for holding invento-
ries.
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have more incentive to accumulate inventories than those
located between [q̄, qu]. After a positive aggregate productivity shock, the average
input price q̄ decreases to q̄ − φ, where φ > 0. Figure 2.6 also shows how the dis-
tribution shifts. Given that firms do not know that the economy has experienced a
positive productivity innovation, all the firms have an incentive to accumulate more
inventories. Firms located between [q̄, qu − φ] (part A in Figure 2.6) are in the right
tail of the new distribution, but they are not sure that the distribution has changed.
As a consequence, those firms do not sell as many inventories as they would under
full information. In the model with perfect information, those same firms know that
the economy has been shocked, they know that their input price is relatively high,
and they know about the big jump in total demand. Therefore, these firms sell a
high volume of inventories when the economy experiences a positive productivity





(part B of Figure 2.6) attach some probability under imperfect
information that they are facing low real input prices with respect to the whole
distribution. Therefore, they accumulate more inventories than they would absent
information frictions. Finally, firms between
[
bl − φ, bl
]
(part C in Figure 2.6) know
that the input price distribution has changed, since their input price has probability
zero under the old distribution. Hence, those firms accumulate inventories not only
11I solve the model assuming that this schock is log-normal, but assuming a uniform distribution
is helpful for discussing the intuition behind the results.
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because they know that their input price is relatively low, but also because they
have better expectations about the evolution of the economy, and they know that
aggregate demand will keep increasing for another couple of periods.
The aggregate price index falls in the model with information frictions as the
economy is able to produce more goods at a lower price. However, in comparison
with the model with perfect information, the magnitude of the price decline is
smaller. This is because the firms in the right tail of the idiosyncratic input price
distribution do not sell as many inventories. Hence, these firms set a higher price.
Since firms accumulate more inventories under imperfect information, current profits
decline. This explain why the increase in the aggregate demand and output is smaller
under imperfect information, since household’s income is expanding at a slower rate.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions to a Productivity Shock. Model with Information Frictions
Note: This Figure plots the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in the total aggregate productivity in a model in which final
goods firms observe aggregate variables with one period lag. All figures are deviations with respect to the steady state. Change in
inventories is the change in inventories as a fraction of output in steady state. Total investment is the sum of fixed capital investment
and inventory investment. Intermediate good price is the average of the input prices.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions to a Productivity Shock. Model with Perfect and Complete Information Vs Model
with Information Frictions
Note: This Figure compares the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in total aggregate productivity for two different models.
Complete and Perfect Information- Model with heterogeneous firms and output inventories in which agents have perfect and complete
information. Information Frictions- Model with heterogeneous firms and output inventories in which firms observe aggregate variables
with one period lag.
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q̄ − φql − φ qu − φ
q̄ql qu
Note: This figure illustrates how the distribution of final goods firms changes after a
productivity shock. Assuming that the idiosyncratic cost (ϕ) distributes uniform, the





a productivity shock, the distribution shifts to the left (After shock). Firm in part A
and B, do not have enough evidence to conclude that the economy was shocked, and
they think that they have more incentives to accumulate inventories. Only firms in
part C conclude that the distribution changed.
2.4.3.2 Nominal Shock
Figure 2.7 plots the impulse response functions of this economy to a 1% de-
crease in the money growth rate. After the shock, intermediate goods firms observe
a decrease in their nominal input price and nominal demand. They do not know
the source of these changes. They only know that they could be facing a positive
productivity shock (aggregate or idiosyncratic), a contractionary nominal shock, or
a combination of both. Given that there is some probability that they are facing
a positive productivity shock, firms accumulate inventories in the first period. As
explained above, this response is amplified by the fact that firms located in the right
tail of the input price distribution do not sell their stocks of inventories as much as
they would under perfect information.
The large increase in inventories reduces current profits (ΠF ), and as conse-
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quence household income. Since households want to smooth their consumption,
they consume a part of their capital and work more. In the second quarter, when
firms see that the economy was shocked by a lower money growth, they realize that
they made a mistake by accumulating inventories. So they reduce their production
and sell a large fraction of their inventories.
The dynamics of total investment (capital plus inventory) follow the output
dynamics. However, the magnitude of fluctuations is larger for investment than for
output. Notice that output decreases 0.18% in the first quarter while investment
goes down by 0.67%. The output and investment troughs are in quarter two, when
output decreases 0.38% and investment falls 2.26%.
2.4.3.3 Business Cycle Moments
Following Cooley and Hansen (1995), Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show variables’ stan-
dard deviations, cross-correlations with output, and correlations with the money
growth rate from simulating the model with perfect information (Table 2.3), and
the model with information frictions (Table 2.4). For each table, the economy was
simulated for 2,100 quarters, and the first 100 observations were dropped. The ar-
tificial series were logged and then detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. To
assess these models, I compare these tables with the numbers reported in Table 2.5,
which presents business cycle statistics for the U.S. economy.
It is not surprising that the standard deviations increase in the model with
information frictions, since this model adds more uncertainty to the intermediate
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firms’ problem, and generates real responses to nominal shocks. Also, total invest-
ment and change in inventories become the most volatile variables in the model
with information frictions, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. Sim-
ilarly, prices become more stable in the model with imperfect information. The
standard deviations of the price level and inflation are smaller, and they are even
smaller in relative terms when compared to output. This is because firms carry
more inventories on average to smooth shocks. The correlations with output in the
model with information frictions are also closer to the data. In particular, inven-
tory investment is pro-cyclical in the model with information frictions, and total
investment is strongly correlated with output.
Finally, Figure 2.8 shows the optimal price series (left panel) for a firm facing
a particular series of demand and input price shocks (right panel). The black line
in the left panel shows the optimal price series for a firm that cannot accumulate
inventories; the red line shows the price set by a final goods firm that can accumulate
inventories and that has perfect information; and the blue line shows the price set
by a firm that can accumulate inventories but that faces the information friction.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Business Cycles Statistics. US Economy 1967-2012
Variable SD(%) Relative
Cross Correlation of Output with Corr
x(-4) x(-3) x(-2) x(-1) x x(+1) x(+2) x(+3) x(+4) with µ
Output 1.55 1.00 0.29 0.49 0.70 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.70 0.49 0.29 -0.13
Consumption 0.86 0.56 0.34 0.53 0.69 0.82 0.84 0.77 0.65 0.50 0.31 -0.19
Hours 1.60 1.03 0.08 0.28 0.49 0.70 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.73 0.56 -0.34
Price level 1.31 0.85 -0.65 -0.67 -0.65 -0.56 -0.42 -0.27 -0.12 0.04 0.20 -0.30
Inflation 1.47 0.95 -0.41 -0.31 -0.17 0.01 0.22 0.38 0.50 0.57 0.59 -0.39
Investment 6.97 4.50 0.32 0.48 0.65 0.80 0.91 0.80 0.60 0.37 0.13 -0.14
Change Inv 17.3 11.16 0.07 0.22 0.39 0.53 0.67 0.51 0.27 0.04 -0.15 -0.30
Real Int rate 1.31 0.84 -0.31 -0.16 0.01 0.24 0.42 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.47 -0.52
Money growth 2.61 1.68 0.11 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.13 -0.21 -0.26 -0.26 -0.21 1.00
Note: This table presents the standard deviations, cross-correlation with output, and correlations with the money growth rate for the US economy.
Series were logged and then detrended by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. “Relative” is the relative standard deviation with respect to output.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response Functions to a Nominal Shock. Model with Information Frictions
Note: This Figure plots the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate in a model in which final goods
firms observe aggregate variables with one period lag. All figures are deviations with respect to the steady state. Change in inventories
is the change in inventories as a fraction of output in steady state. Total investment is the sum of fixed capital investment and inventory
investment. Intermediate good price is the average of the input prices.
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Figure 2.8: Simulated Price for Three Different Models
Note: This Figure plots the simulated output price charged by a particular final goods firms in three different models. The right panel
plot the simulated input price and demand. The left panel shows the price charged by the final goods firm. No inventories- The final
goods firm cannot accumulate inventories. No info frictions- firm can accumulate inventories and has perfect and complete information.
Info frictions- firm can accumulate inventories but observes aggregate variables with one period lag.
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Table 2.6: Price Statistics for a Simulated Final Goods Firm
Model Mean St. Dev
First Auto- Correlation with
correlation q(j) d(j)
No Inventories 0.878 0.079 0.031 0.998 -0.067
No Information Frictions 0.851 0.062 0.548 0.673 -0.049
Information Frictions 0.845 0.061 0.551 0.626 0.069
Note: This table present the mean, standard deviation, first autocorrelation, and the
correlation with the input price and demand for a final goods firm. No inventories-
price charged by a final goods firm in a model in which firms cannot accumulate
inventories and have perfect information. No Information Frictions- price charged by a
final goods firm in a model in which firms can accumulate inventories and have perfect
and complete information. Information Frictions- price charged by a final goods firm
in a model in which firms observe aggregate variables with a lag and can accumulate
inventories.
Notice that the correlation between firms’ output prices and input prices is
very strong (0.998) when firms cannot accumulate inventories. In contrast, when
firms can accumulate inventories, this correlation decreases by almost 40%. Hence,
inventories break the strong relationship between current input prices and current
output prices. Also, introducing inventories adds persistence to prices. The first
autocorrelation of the output price increases from almost zero to 0.55. As discussed
above, inventories are used to smooth the marginal cost of production, which also
implies price smoothing in the context of monopolistic competition.
2.4.4 Persistence of Idiosyncratic Shocks
In this chapter, I have assumed that idiosyncratic shocks are completely tran-
sitory. This is an important assumption that helps to explain real responses to
monetary shocks. In order to see this, notice that equation (2.37), which governs
the inventory decisions, would always hold with strict inequality in steady state if
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idiosyncratic shocks were permanent, and therefore the optimal inventory decision
would be zero (I∗jt+1 = 0). This is because, the role of inventories is to smooth pro-
duction decision and therefore prices. If idiosyncratic shocks were permanent, firms
will respond by adjusting their prices and keeping their inventories level constant
in response to a idiosyncratic shock. To illustrate this, Figure 2.9 plots the impulse
response functions of the aggregate price index and the aggregate output to a 1%
decrease in the money growth rate when the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks are
equal to: (1) zero (solid black line/baseline), (2) 0.3 (dashed line), and (3) 0.5 (dot-
ted line). As we can see, the closer idiosyncratic shocks are to be permanent, the
larger the price response and the smaller the output response.
Figure 2.9: Price and Output Responses. Different Persistence of Idiosyncratic
Shocks
2.5 Conclusions
In the past decade, much progress has been made on models studying the
impact of information frictions on aggregate supply. However, an assumption in the
existing literature is that pricing managers do not interact with production managers
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within firms. If this assumption is relaxed, nominal shocks would not have real effects
on the economy in existing models. Hence, it is not clear why nominal shocks have
real effects when prices are flexible and there is perfect communication within firms
(input prices and demand are perfectly observed by pricing managers).
In this chapter, I present a model with information frictions, output inven-
tories, and perfect communication within firms in which nominal shocks have real
effects on the economy. In this model, intermediate goods firms observe aggregate
variables with a lag but receive information on their nominal input prices and de-
mand in real time. In this model, inventories helps to explain the non-neutrality of
nominal shocks for the following reason: given that firms only observe their nominal
input prices and demand, they will accumulate inventories (by producing more) as
long as they think that they are facing low real input prices. After a contractionary
nominal shock, firms observe lower nominal input prices. They do not know what
the source of this change is, but they know that it could be due to a positive produc-
tivity innovation or due to a nominal shock. Since positive shocks have a positive
probability, firms will increase their stock of inventories. This will prevent firms’
prices from decreasing, which will distort relative prices, and will make current prof-
its and households’ income go down. As a consequence, aggregate demand and real
output fall.
According to my model simulations, a negative nominal shock reduces output
by 0.17% in the first quarter and by 0.38% in the second quarter, followed by a slow
recovery to the steady state. Contractionary nominal shocks have also significant ef-
fects on investment, which remains 1% below the steady state for the first 6 quarters.
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Investment responds to an aggregate nominal perturbation by -0.67% in the initial
quarter and reaches its trough in the second quarter when it falls by 2.26%. I also
find that information frictions make the model more consistent with the empirical
evidence on inventory behavior. In the model with information frictions, inventory
investment is counter-cyclical; and its standard deviation is closer to the data.
I show that this model does not generate real effects of nominal shocks when
there is perfect communication within firms if firms do not accumulate inventories
or capital, even when firms have imperfect information about aggregate shocks. In
contrast, I show that if firms make investment decisions (capital accumulation or
inventory decisions) and if their nominal input prices and demand do not perfectly
reveal the aggregate state of nature, the economy exhibits money non-neutrality
even under flexible prices and perfect communication within firms (Proposition 3).
In those situations, firms need to forecast future aggregate conditions in order to
make optimal current decisions. Hence, when current input prices and demand do
not perfectly reveal aggregate conditions, firms make forecast errors because their
inference about the state of the nature is wrong, and their real decisions deviate
from the decision that would have been taken under perfect information.
This chapter introduces money non-neutrality by allowing firm to accumulate
inventories and not capital as the Proposition 3 also suggests. However, this does
imply that inventories are more relevant than capital accumulation for the monetary
authority. The relative importance of inventories versus capital accumulation is left
for future work. The main point of this chapter is that investment decisions are key
for money non-neutrality under flexible prices and perfect communication within
131
firms. Similarly, in the spirit of Lucas (1972), this work points out that firms
input prices and demand contain noisy but important information about aggregate
conditions, and how firms process that information is key for understanding real
responses to monetary shocks. The relevant literature, including Angeletos and
La’O (2012), abstracts from this signal extraction problem.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1: Statistics for Business Cycle Driven by TFP: U.S. Economy 1964:Q1-2014:Q4
u v v/u y c Inv wa ws wu wc wn a
Standard deviation 0.14 0.13 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (-)
Autocorrelation 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.90
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (-)
Correlation Matrix
u 1 -0.99 -0.99 -0.96 -0.92 -0.94 -0.86 -0.87 -0.85 -0.81 -0.82 -0.86
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.49) (0.47) (0.05)
v 1 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.97 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.91
(0.015) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.47) (0.45) (0.42) (0.49) (0.48) (0.05)
v/u 1 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.89
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.47) (0.45) (0.42) (0.49) (0.48) (0.05)
y 1 0.95 0.98 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.94
(0.04) (0.09) (0.44) (0.43) (0.37) (0.46) (0.45) (0.06)
c 1 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.79
(0.03 (0.48) (0.47) (0.42) (0.51) (0.49) (0.03)
Inv 1 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.97
(0.49) (0.47) (0.43) (0.51) (0.50) (0.02)
wa 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.67
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.50)
ws 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.70
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.48)
wu 1 0.98 0.99 0.65
(0.09) (0.07) (0.45)





Notes: This table reports the business cycle moments driven by TFP shocks and their standard deviation (in parentheses) computed via
bootstrap. For more details see Table 1.2.
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Table A.2: Simulated Business Cycle. Calibrated Model in which Both Firms and Workers Face Information Frictions.
u v v/u y c Inv wa ws wu wc wn a
Standard deviation 0.125 0.165 0.273 0.025 0.013 0.082 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.018
Autocorrelation 0.900 0.803 0.912 0.935 0.986 0.937 0.975 0.975 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.871
Correlation Matrix
u 1 -0.757 -0.918 -0.850 -0.465 -0.928 -0.736 -0.736 -0.703 -0.735 -0.726 -0.824
v 1 0.954 0.791 0.254 0.890 0.538 0.538 0.523 0.538 0.533 0.895
v/u 1 0.870 0.368 0.966 0.664 0.664 0.640 0.664 0.657 0.921
y 1 0.769 0.949 0.940 0.940 0.931 0.940 0.938 0.974
c 1 0.543 0.929 0.928 0.945 0.929 0.934 0.634
Inv 1 0.810 0.810 0.786 0.809 0.802 0.965
wa 1 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.847
ws 1 0.997 1.000 0.999 0.847
wu 1 0.998 0.999 0.836
wc 1 1.000 0.847
wn 1 0.844
a 1
Notes: Statistics for the simulated economy when both firms and workers face information frictions: u: Unemployment level. v:
Vacancies v/u: Vancancy-unemployment ratio. y: Output. c: Consumption. Inv: Investment. wa: Average wage in the economy. ws:
Average wage for job stayers. wu: Average wage for new workers (workers who were unemployed in the previous period). wc: Average
wage for job changers. wn: Average wage for new hires (new workers + job changers). a: Aggregate TFP. All series are seasonally
adjusted, logged, and detrended with the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100,000.
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Table A.3: Business Cycle Moments (Data versus Model)
u v v/u y c Inv wa wn a
Standard Deviation
Data 0.18 0.18 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02
Filtered Data 0.14 0.13 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02
Model 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02
Auto-correlation
Data 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.21 0.22 0.91
Filtered Data 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.90
Model 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.87
Correlation with output
Data -0.88 0.90 0.94 1.00 0.89 0.82 0.17 0.15 0.80
Filtered Data -0.96 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.87 0.83 0.94
Model -0.88 0.90 0.94 1.00 0.70 0.93 0.85 0.84 0.95
Correlation with TFP
Data -0.48 0.53 0.52 0.80 0.73 0.69 0.17 0.15 1.00
Filtered Data -0.86 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.79 0.97 0.67 0.60 1.00
Model -0.81 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.47 0.66 0.66 1.00
Notes: This table reports business cycle statistics for the U.S. economy and a
simulated economy. Statistics reported in the Data, Filter data, and Model rows
were previously presented in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.6. u: Unemployment level. v:
Vacancies v/u: Vancancy-unemployment ratio. y: Output. c: Consumption. Inv:
Investment. wa: Average wage in the economy. wn: Average wage for new hires
(new workers + job changers). a: Aggregate TFP.
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
If all agents in the economy have complete and perfect information, the fol-
lowing strategy profiles constitute the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of
this game:
• For the worker:




U(ω,Ω) = ϑ · Sj
– To demand a wage equal to y∗ such that
−→
W j(y
∗, ω,Ω)−U(ω,Ω) = Sj and
−→
J j(y
∗, ωf ,Ω) = 0.
• For the firm:
– To offer x∗.
– To accept only wage demands that are less than or equal to y∗.
Proof. I begin at the third stage of the game (i.e. when the worker makes an offer).
At this stage, the firm will accept any wage demand y as long as
−→
J j(y, hj,Ω) ≥ 0.
Hence, the worker will demand a wage y∗ such that
−→
J j(y
∗, hj,Ω) = 0 and she keeps
all the match surplus. Thus, at the second stage (i.e. when the worker has to
accept or reject the firm’s offer), the worker knows that if she rejects this offer, her
expected payoff at the third stage will be ϑ · Sj. Therefore, she will only accept
141
wage offers that are greater than or equal to x∗ where
−→
W j(x
∗, ω,Ω) − U = ϑ · Sj.
Finally, at the first stage of the game (i.e. when the firm makes an initial offer),
the firm anticipates a payoff of zero if it makes an offer less than x∗ and a payoff
of
−→
J j(x, hj,Ω) if x ≥ x∗. Hence, the firm offers exactly x∗ to the worker and she
accepts it.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that agents are information-constrained as described in section 1.2.4.
If there is an equilibrium in which firms’ strategy is to reveal the aggregate state of
the economy, the best strategy for firms is the same strategy described in Lemma 1.
Proof. Since we are considering the equilibrium of the game, if firms are following a
revealing strategy, workers know it and behave rationally. As a consequence, workers
can perfectly infer the current state of the economy based on the firm’s wage offer.
Hence, a worker knows that she will receive, in expectation, ϑ ·Sj if she rejects
a firm’s offer. Therefore, the optimal strategy for workers is:
• Infer the current level of the aggregate productivity based on firm’s offer x:
a = x−1(a)
• To accept only wage offers greater than or equal to x∗ where:
−→
W j(x
∗, ω,Ω)− U = ϑ · Sj
−→
J j(x
∗, ω,Ω) = 0
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• To demand a wage equal to y∗ if she has the chance such that:
−→
W j(y
∗, ω,Ω)− U = Sj
Now, given the workers’ strategy, the firm anticipates a payoff of zero if it
makes an offer less than x∗ and a payoff of
−→
J j(x, hj,Ω) − U if x ≥ x∗. Given that
−→
J j(x, hj,Ω) is strictly decreasing in x, the optimal strategy for firms, assuming that
they follow a revealing strategy is:
• To offer x∗.
• To accept only wage demands that are less than or equal to y∗.
As a consequence, if there exists an equilibrium in which firms reveal the true
state of the economy, in equilibrium firms offer exactly x∗ and workers will accept
it. In other words, workers rationally believe that if a firm extents a wage offer x,
it has to be the case that x = x∗.
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3
If agents in the economy are information-constrained as described in section
1.2.4, then in equilibrium, firms do not follow a strategy in which they perfectly
reveal the true state of the economy.
Proof. Suppose not. By Lemma A.2.2, if there is an equilibrium in which firms reveal
the true state of the economy, firms always offer x = x∗ and workers accept all wage
offers (x) because they rationally believe that x is always equal to x∗. However,
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in order for these strategies to be an equilibrium, firms cannot have incentives to
deviate.
Suppose that firms deviate to an strategy in which they offer x̃ = 0.5x∗.
Workers will accept this offer because they believe x̃ = x∗, and firms will be better
off because Jj(x̃) > Jj(x
∗). Therefore, there is not an equilibrium in which firms
reveal the true state of the economy.
A.2.4 Proof of Lemma 4
If agents in the economy are information-constrained as described in section
1.2.4, the following strategy profiles constitute a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
• For the worker:






= ϑ · EIh [Sj]







• For the firm:
– To offer x∗∗.




∗∗, ωf ,Ω) = 0.
Proof. I begin at the third stage of the game (i.e. when the worker gets to make an
offer). At this stage, the firm will accept any wage demand y as long as its expected
value is greater than or equal to zero. Given the firm’s strategy, the firm’s offer
does not reveal its information. Therefore, the worker will demand a wage y∗∗ such
that, given her information set, firm’s value is zero. Thus, at the second stage (i.e.
when the worker has to accept or reject the firm’s offer), the worker knows that if she
rejects this offer, her expected payoff at the third stage will be ϑ·EIh [Sj]. Therefore,
she will only accept wage offers that are greater than or equal to x∗∗. Finally, at
the first stage of the game (i.e. when the firm makes an offer), the firm anticipates
a payoff of zero if it makes an offer less than x∗∗ and a payoff of
−→
J j(x, hj,Ω) ≥ 0 if
x ≥ x∗∗. Hence, the firm offers exactly x∗∗ to the worker and she accepts it.
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A.3 Detailed Household’s Problem
This appendix presents the household’s problem in recursive form and the com-
plete derivation of the employment and unemployment functions. The household’s









dj + βE [U (ω′,Ω′)] (A.1)




subject to the budget constraint, the law of motion of labor, and the perceived
law of motion of the economy:






πjdj + b · u− T (A.3)
















Ω′ = λh (Ω) (A.6)
where EIh [·] is the expectation conditional on the household information set
Ih. ω = {k, {hj}, Ih} is the vector of state variables for household, and Ω is a vector
that summarizes the aggregate state of the economy. Letting φc and φj denote the
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k′ : EIh {−φc + βφ′c(r′ + 1− δk)} = 0 (A.8)























dx}} = 0 (A.9)
Hence, combining (A.7) and (A.9) and lagging one period:
EIh{(Wj(ω,Ω)− U(ω,Ω))} =EIh{wj − zj (A.10)
+ E{Q((1− δh)(1− īqFj)(Wj(ω′,Ω′)− U(ω′,Ω′))








′,Ω′)− U(ω′,Ω′)) = φj
βφ′c
(A.12)
Also from the first order conditions, we can verify that the optimality condi-
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tions for c is given by:
c−σ = βEIh
[





In this appendix, I present more details about my empirical exercise and some
additional experiments using other wage series.
A.4.1 Wage series
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct wage series adjusted
for composition effects. The CPS is the main labor force survey for the U.S., and
it is the primary source of labor force statistics such as the national unemployment
rate. The CPS consists of a rotating panel where households and their members are
surveyed for four consecutive months, not surveyed for the following eight months,
and interviewed again for another four consecutive months. The CPS includes in-
dividual information such as employment status, sex, education, race, state, etc.
However, individual earnings and hours worked are collected only in the fourth and
eight interviews. In addition, since 1994, individuals have been asked if they still
work in the same job reported in the previous month, making it possible to identify
job changers. Following Muller (2012) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2013),
my empirical model is based on the following equation:
log(wit) = Xitβ + log(w̃it) (A.14)
where wit is the hourly wage rate for individual i at time t, Xit is a vector of
individual characteristics, and w̃it is the component of the wage rate for individual i
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at time t that is orthogonal to individual i’s characteristics. The hourly wage rate is
constructed by dividing weekly earnings by weekly hours. Following Schmitt (2003),
top-coded weekly earnings are imputed assuming a log-normal cross-sectional distri-
bution for earnings. Following Haefke et al. (2013) I drop hourly wage rates below
the 0.25th and above the 99.75th percentiles each month. In order to take into
account changes over time in the regression coefficients, I estimate equation (A.14)
period by period controlling for: education, a fourth order polynomial in experi-
ence, gender, race, marital status, state, 10 occupation dummies, and 14 industry
dummies.1 Then, I use the residuals from this Mincer regression to construct the









where G={All, Job stayers, New hires, Job Changers, New hires from unem-
ployment (new workers)}, and ωit is individual i’s weight.2 Due to sample design,
it is not possible to match individuals in the fourth quarter of 1995. Hence, with
the exception of the average wage for all workers, wage series have a missing value
in this period. In order to fill these missing observations, for continuity, I impute
these series using the average wage for all workers. However, my results are robust
to limiting my sample period to 1996-2014.
1For occupation and industry, I use variables OCC1950 and IND1950 provided by IPUMS-CPS.
Experience is defined as age minus years of education minus 6.
2Following the literature, individual i’s weight is the product of the individual weight reported
by the BLS and hours worked.
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A.4.2 Alternative wage series (Haefke et al, 2013)
Haefke et al. (2013) constructed two wage series for production and non-
supervisory employees adjusted for composition effects, which they have kindly made
available online. In this subsection, I show that these series tell a similar story: wage
responses to TFP shocks are delayed and weak. In particular, Figure A.5 plots the
impulse response functions of these wages to a 1% increase in aggregate TFP. The
sample period is 1984Q1-2006Q1, which is the same one used in Haefke et al. (2013).
In order to fill in the missing values in 1985 and 1995, I impute these series using
the real aggregate wage.
Figure A.5: IRFs to 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity. Average Wage for
Production and Nonsupervisory Employees
Note: This figure plots the impulse responses to a 1% increase in TFP from bivari-
ate near-VARs with two lags (solid black lines), where TFP is taken to follow an
exogenous AR(1) process. All variables are HP-filtered in logs with smoothing pa-
rameter equal to 105. All figures are expressed in percentage points. The x axis
represents quarters after the TFP shock. The shaded area represents the 95% confi-
dence intervals computed via bootstrap. The sample period is 1984Q1-2006Q1. The
dashed lines are the IRFs generated by a calibrated model, in which only workers
face information frictions (benchmark). The dotted lines are the IRFs generated by
a calibrated model in which all agents have perfect information.
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A.4.3 Results for average wage of production and non-supervisory
employees
In order to illustrate the role of composition effects, Figure A.6 plots the IRFs
to a 1% increase in TFP of the average wage for production and non-supervisory
employees.
Figure A.6: IRFs to 1% Increase in Aggregate Productivity. Average Wage for
Production and Nonsupervisory Employees
Note: This figure plots the impulse responses to a 1% increase in TFP from bivariate
near-VARs with three lags, where TFP is taken to follow an exogenous AR(1) process.
All variables are HP-filtered in logs. For the two figures at the left a smoothing
parameter equal to 105 was used. For the tow figures at the right a smoothing
parameter equal to 1,600 was used. The sample period for the top row is 1964Q1-
2014Q4. The sample period the bottom row is 1994Q1-2014Q4. All figures are
expressed in percentage points. The x axis represents quarters after the TFP shock.
The shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals computed via bootstrap.
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This figure shows that this series is acyclical. Even ignoring the wide confi-
dence intervals, the point estimates of these IRFs are very small in absolute terms.
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Lemma 5
pjt is strictly decreasing in Ijt
Proof. First, notice that V (I, q, d)it is a strictly increasing and concave function in
I. Notice that the firm’s problem could be written as follows:
















Ijt+1 ≥ 0 (B.2)
Since ε > 1 and γ ≤ 1, the first term in (B.1) is strictly concave, and the second
term is convex. Hence, this problem is strictly concave. Then, using the envelope
theorem, we get that V (I, q, d)0 is strictly increasing in I. Thus, V (I, q, d) is strictly
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increasing and concave in I. Then, using the envelope theorem:







pjt > 0 (B.3)











Assuming that ε > 1 and that γ ≤ 1, the optimal decision rules for pjt and
Ijt+1 have the following properties:
• The current optimal price (p∗jt) is strictly increasing in the firm’s current de-
mand (djt) and input prices (qjt).



































• The current optimal price (p∗jt) is weakly increasing in the firm’s future demand
(djt+1) and input prices qjt+1.
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Proof. Using these results and the optimality condition for inventories (2.37),
we obtain:
pjt ≥ E [Qt,t+1pjt+1] (B.7)









> 0 if I∗jt+1 > 0 (B.8)
∂pjt
∂X
= 0 if I∗jt+1 = 0 (B.9)
• The optimal next period’s stock of inventories (I∗jt+1) is weakly decreasing in
the firm’s current demand (djt) and input prices qjt. Moreover, if the initial
stock of inventories is positive (Ijt > 0), I
∗
jt+1 is strictly decreasing in djt and
qjt.










> 0 if I∗jt+1 > 0 (B.10)
∂pjt+1
∂X












= 0 if I∗jt+1 = 0 (B.13)
• The optimal next period’s stock of inventories (I∗jt+1) is weakly increasing in
the firm’s future demand (djt+1) and input prices (qjt+1).










= 0 if I∗jt+1 = 0 (B.15)
B.1.3 Lemma 7
At the firm level, inventories impose an upper bound for the increase in the












The set of real allocations
{
Ct, Kt, It, Yt, Xt, Ht, yjt, hjt, kjt
}
and distri-
bution of final goods firms {λ(I, q, d)t} that are consistent with the existence of a
competitive equilibrium is independent of the path for money.
Proof. Notice that we can re-write the set of equations that describe the competitive
equilibrium in a form that does not involve the nominal interest rate. To see this,
we need to define the real rental rate of capital rt = Rt/Pt, the real wage rate
wt = Wt/Pt, and relative prices p̃jt = pjt/Pt and q̃jt = qjt/Pt. Also, the stochastic
discount factor becomes: Q̃0,t = βu
′(Ct)/u
′(C0). By defining and replacing these
variables in the set of equations that describe the competitive equilibrium, we get a
system of equations that are independent of the nominal interest rate.
B.1.5 Proposition 2
Suppose that all agents in the economy except firms have perfect and com-
plete information. Moreover, assume that intermediate goods producers cannot hold



















yt = st (B.19)
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If prices are flexible, and if there is perfect communication within firms such
that pricing managers perfectly observe their input prices and demand, then nominal
shocks do not have real effects on the economy regardless of the information friction
on aggregate variables.
Proof. In Proposition 1, I showed that the set of equations that describe the compet-
itive equilibrium under perfect information could be written in a form that does not
involve the nominal variables. Since the only equations that change under informa-
tion frictions are those involving intermediate goods firms, I only need to show that
those equations can be written in a form that does not involve nominal variables.
First, notice that the intermediate goods firms problem can be re-stated as:































And, using the definition of dt, we have:

















Therefore, the firm’s relative price, (p∗t/Pt), is independent of the nominal
variables, and therefore so is the set of allocations that are consistent with the
159
existence of a competitive equilibrium.
B.1.6 Proposition 3
Suppose that all agents in the economy except firms have perfect and complete
information. If intermediate goods firms can accumulate inventories or capital and
their input prices and demand do not reveal the aggregate state of the economy, the
economy exhibits money non-neutrality.
Proof. If firms accumulate inventories their problem becomes:

















yt = st + It+1 − It (B.25)
It+1 ≥ 0 (B.26)























Notice that the optimal current price depends not only on the firm’s current
demand and input prices but also on current inventory investment, which according
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to (B.28) depends on firm’s expectations. Similarly, if a intermediate goods firm
can accumulate capital, its problem becomes:




















yt = st (B.31)
kt+1 = (1− δK)kt + xt (B.32)



































t+1 + pxt+1(1− δK)
]}
(B.34)
Notice that in both cases investment decisions depend on firms’ expectations.
Hence, if firms’ expectations under informational frictions are not equal to those
under perfect and complete information, firms’ decision rules would not be equal.
Using the same notation as in Hamilton (1994) and under these assumption,
we can summarize firms’ expectations by the following signal extraction problem.
Denoting ξ as the vector of aggregate state variables of the economy and y as the
vector of contemporaneous variables that a firm perfectly observes (input prices and
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demand), we get that:
ξt+1 = φ (ξt) + υt+1 (B.35)
yt = a(xt) + h(ξt) + wt (B.36)
Where φ, a, and h are non-linear functions, xt is a vector of observed and
exogenous variables, and υt and wt are vector of unobserved i.i.d. shocks. υ ∼
N(0, Q), and wt ∼ N(0, R). Hence, this system can be linearized as follows:










Where ξ̂t|j is the expected value of ξt given information until period j. Hence,
the contemporaneous inference about the aggregate state of the economy ξ̃t|t is given
by:











Notice that under perfect and complete information ξ̃t|t = ξ̂t|t for all t. There-
fore, if ξ̃t|t 6= ξ̂t|t firms cannot perfectly infer the aggregate state of the nature and,
as a consequence, firms’ decision rules will deviate from those under perfect and
complete information. This occurs when r + n < r + k + z where r is the number
of state variables, n the number of perfectly observed variables by a firm, k is the
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number of non-zero elements in the main diagonal of Q, and z is the number of
non-zero elements in the main diagonal of R. In that case, the number of equations
(r+n) is greater than the number of unknown variables (r+ k+ z). In other word,
the number of variables observed by firms has to be lower than the total number of
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks that producers face. One should note that z = 0
does not guarantee that ξ̃t|t = ξ̂t|t, it only implies that firms can perfectly infer the
value of h (ξt)
B.2 Computation of the Model With Perfect and Complete Informa-
tion
I approximate the model by assuming that the idiosyncratic shocks, ϕ and χ,





Γχ = {χ1...χnχ}, and ΓI = {0, I2...Ini}. I find the transition probability matri-
ces Πϕ and Πχ for ϕ and χ using the Tauchen’s method. Defining the variable




such that: z = zr if ϕ = ϕceil(r/nχ) and χ = χmod(r,nχ), I
specify the time varying distribution matrix Λt of size (ni×nz) such that the row l,
column r element represents the fraction of firms in state (I l, zr).1 Following Costain
and Nakov (2011), given the decision rule I(I, z) = argmax{I′∈R+} V (I
′, I, z)i, inven-
tories holdings are kept on the grid ΓI by rounding I(I, z) up or down stochastically
without changing the mean. Specifically, for each w ∈ {1, 2, ...nz}, define matrix
1Being more precise, Γz =
{
(ϕ1, χ1), (ϕ1, χ2)...(ϕ2, χ1), (ϕ2, χ2)...(ϕnb, χ, 1)...(ϕnb, χnχ
}
, and
its transition probability matrix is given by Πz = Πϕ ⊗Πχ
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Ilt(r,w)−Ilt(r,w)−1 in column r, row lt(r, w)− 1
I∗r,wt −Ilt(r,w)−1
Ilt(r,w)−Ilt(r,w)−1 in column r, row lt(r, w)
(B.40)
Where
I∗r,wt = arg max{I′∈R+}
V (I ′, I = Ir, z = zw)i (B.41)
I lt(r,w) = min
{
I ∈ ΓI : I ≥ I∗r,wt
}
(B.42)
Hence, the evolution of Λt can be computed as:
vec(Λt+1) = (Π
z ′ ⊗ Ini)×R× vec(Λt) (B.43)
R =

R1 0ni · · · 0ni
0ni R





0ni 0ni · · · Rnz

(B.44)
Where Ini is the identity matrix of size ni.
2 Similarly, the row l, column r
element of the pricing, inventory and profit functions (p(I, z), I(I, z), and π(I, z)i)
2 define Λ̃t such that:





Where Xwt is the column w of matrix Xt, and 0x is the zeros matrix of size nz. Hence, the row
k, column w element of matrix Λ̃t represents the fraction of firms in state z = z
w that, regardless
of their initial inventories holdings, have an stock of inventories equal to Ik at the end of period t.
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are given by:
p(I l, zr)t × I(I l, zr)t = E
[
Q× p(I(I l, zr), z)t+1 × Πz(:, zr)′
]
I(I l, zr)t (B.51)









l, zr)1−εt + I(I
l, zr)t − I l
)
(B.52)
π(I l, zr)it = d(z
r)tp(I
l, zr)1−εt − q(zr)t
(
d(zr)p(I l, zr)1−εt + I(I
l, zr)t − I l
)
(B.53)
Where d(zr)t and q(z
r)t are the values of d and q consistent with z = z
r. It
is worth pointing out that the expectation in equation (B.51) is over the aggregate
shocks of the economy. The expectation over the evolution of z is written explicitly
by multiplying by Πz. Hence, the vector of aggregate variables is given by:
−→
X t ≡ {vec(Λt), Kt,Πt, Pt, Dt, q̄t, Qt, Yt, CtHt, rt, wt, vec(I(I, z)t)} (B.54)
Vector
−→
X t along with the vector of shocks
−→
Z t = (log(At), µt) consist of
2(ni × nz) + 11 endogenous variables that are determined by the following system
Therefore, Λt+1 can also be written as:
Λt+1 = Λ̃t ×Πz (B.47)
vec(Λt+1) = vec(Λ̃t ×Πz) (B.48)
vec(Λt+1) = (Π
z ′ ⊗ Ini)× vec(Λ̃t) (B.49)
vec(Λt+1) = (Π
z ′ ⊗ Ini)×R× vec(Λt) (B.50)






















Ct +Kt = wtHt + rtKt + Πt/Pt + (1− δK)Kt (B.58)
P 1−εt = eni

















′ [π(I, z)it. ∗Λt] enz (B.61)
p(I l, zr)t × I(I l, zr)t = E
[
Q× p(I(I l, zr), z)t+1 × Πz(:, zr)′
]
I(I l, zr)t ∀l, z (B.62)
vec(Λt+1) = (Π
z ′ ⊗ Ini)×R× vec(Λt) (B.63)
Dt = A
ε−1
















log(Pt) + log(Yt) = µt (B.67)
Notice that given a inventory decision rule, the price decision rule and current
profit are given by equations (B.52) and (B.53). Following the notation of Costain













This system can linearized by computing numerically the jacobian matrices at
the deterministic steady state, in order to express this system as a first-order linear
expectational difference equation system:
EtA∆
−→






Z t = 0 (B.69)
Where A ≡ D−→
X t+1
F∗, B ≡ D−→
X t
F∗, C ≡ DEt+1F∗, D ≡ DEtF∗. Then this sys-
tem of equations can be solve using the QZ decomposition describe in Klein(2000).
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